diff --git a/fusion_login_audit/models/res_users.py b/fusion_login_audit/models/res_users.py
index 65034bca..c776b244 100644
--- a/fusion_login_audit/models/res_users.py
+++ b/fusion_login_audit/models/res_users.py
@@ -288,28 +288,44 @@ class ResUsers(models.Model):
         """Catch the unknown-user branch of upstream _login.
 
         In Odoo 19 ``_login`` is an *instance* method (not a classmethod as in
-        earlier versions). Upstream raises ``AccessDenied`` when the login
-        string does not resolve to any user — at that point no user record
-        exists, so the ``bad_password`` path in ``_check_credentials`` never
-        fires. We catch the propagating exception here and write a row with
-        ``user_id=NULL`` and ``failure_reason='unknown_user'``.
+        earlier versions). Upstream raises ``AccessDenied`` in three cases:
 
-        ``_fc_record_login_event`` already writes through an INDEPENDENT
-        cursor (``self.env.registry.cursor()``), so the audit row survives
-        the outer transaction rollback that follows the re-raised
-        ``AccessDenied``. We never block the re-raise: any audit-side
-        exception is caught + logged inside the helper.
+        1. Unknown login string — ``_assert_can_auth`` or the user-lookup
+           ``search()`` returns empty → ``_check_credentials`` never fires →
+           THIS override is the only chance to record the attempt.
+        2. Wrong password — user exists, ``_check_credentials`` raises →
+           our ``_check_credentials`` override already wrote a ``bad_password``
+           row → re-raise propagates up to here. We MUST NOT write a second
+           row.
+        3. 2FA failure — same as #2 but ``failure_reason='2fa_failed'``.
+
+        We distinguish #1 from #2/#3 by checking whether the login string
+        resolves to any user. If it does, ``_check_credentials`` ran (and
+        already logged); if it doesn't, the user lookup failed and we log
+        ``unknown_user`` here.
+
+        ``_fc_record_login_event`` writes through an INDEPENDENT cursor
+        (``self.env.registry.cursor()``), so the audit row survives the
+        outer transaction rollback that follows the re-raised
+        ``AccessDenied``. Audit-side exceptions never block the re-raise.
         """
         try:
             return super()._login(credential, user_agent_env)
         except AccessDenied:
-            self._fc_record_login_event(
-                result='failure',
-                failure_reason='unknown_user',
-                user_id=False,
-                attempted_login=(credential or {}).get('login') or 'unknown',
-                _credential=credential,
-            )
+            login = (credential or {}).get('login') or ''
+            try:
+                user_exists = bool(self.sudo().search(
+                    [('login', '=', login)], limit=1))
+            except Exception:
+                user_exists = False  # be permissive — log the row anyway
+            if not user_exists:
+                self._fc_record_login_event(
+                    result='failure',
+                    failure_reason='unknown_user',
+                    user_id=False,
+                    attempted_login=login or 'unknown',
+                    _credential=credential,
+                )
             raise
 
     # ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
diff --git a/fusion_login_audit/tests/test_login_audit.py b/fusion_login_audit/tests/test_login_audit.py
index d7767c77..e6926e64 100644
--- a/fusion_login_audit/tests/test_login_audit.py
+++ b/fusion_login_audit/tests/test_login_audit.py
@@ -237,6 +237,44 @@ class TestFusionLoginAuditModel(TransactionCase):
         self.assertEqual(row.failure_reason, 'unknown_user')
         self.assertEqual(row.result, 'failure')
 
+    def test_login_known_user_bad_password_single_row(self):
+        """When _login is the entry point for an existing user with the
+        wrong password, only ONE failure row is written (bad_password from
+        _check_credentials) — NOT two (bad_password + unknown_user). The
+        unknown_user branch must only fire when the login string does not
+        resolve to any user.
+
+        Regression test for the duplicate-row bug discovered during the
+        production deploy smoke on westin-v19: a single failed login for
+        an existing user was creating two audit rows.
+        """
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'NoDupTester',
+            'login': 'nodup-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'nodup-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        before = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)])
+        raised = False
+        try:
+            self.env['res.users']._login(
+                {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong-not-the-real-one',
+                 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            raised = True
+        self.assertTrue(raised)
+        after = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)])
+        self.assertEqual(after - before, 1,
+                         "Exactly one row per failed login attempt — not two")
+        row = Audit.search([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)],
+                           order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertEqual(row.failure_reason, 'bad_password',
+                         "Existing-user failure must record bad_password, "
+                         "not unknown_user (the user IS in the system)")
+
     def test_computed_last_successful_login(self):
         """x_fc_last_successful_login reflects the latest success row."""
         user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({