Adds four x_fc_* fields on res.users: login_audit_ids (One2many),
login_audit_count (compute), last_successful_login (compute, stored),
last_login_ip (compute, stored). action_fc_view_login_audit returns
a window action scoped to the current user. View inheritance adds a
smart button to the button box and a "Login Activity" page to the
notebook, both gated by base.group_system on the inner XML nodes
(NOT on the view record — Odoo 19 forbids that; see CLAUDE.md rule #11).
Tests (2 new, 18 total green):
test_computed_last_successful_login — uses registry cursor to commit
the audit row so the stored compute picks it up across the
TransactionCase boundary.
test_action_view_login_audit_returns_window_action — smart-button
action shape + domain scoping.
CLAUDE.md rule #11 added: inherited ir.ui.view records cannot have
groups/group_ids on the record; the gate must be on the inner XML nodes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Overrides res.users._login. When the login string does not resolve to
any user, super() raises AccessDenied; we record a row with user_id=NULL
and failure_reason="unknown_user", then re-raise. Closes the gap where
typo'd or scanned logins would otherwise vanish from the audit trail.
The existing _fc_record_login_event helper writes through an independent
registry.cursor(), so the audit row survives the rollback that follows
the re-raised AccessDenied.
Note: in Odoo 19 _login is a plain instance method (not the classmethod
it was in earlier versions) and takes (credential, user_agent_env). The
original plan was written for the classmethod signature; corrected here
and recorded in CLAUDE.md rule #10 so future-Claude does not waste time
re-discovering it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wraps res.users._check_credentials. On AccessDenied, records a row with
result=failure and failure_reason='bad_password' (or '2fa_failed' when
credential['type'] == 'totp'), then re-raises. Regression test asserts
the attempted password value never lands in any audit field.
The audit row is written through registry.cursor() (independent cursor) so
it survives the rollback that follows AccessDenied — in production
odoo/service/model.py::retrying resets the transaction and http.py closes
the cursor without committing, in tests assertRaises opens its own
savepoint. Either way an inline write would vanish. Tests
enter registry_test_mode and use manual try/except to keep the audit row
visible across the savepoint hierarchy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Overrides res.users._update_last_login to create a fusion.login.audit
row with result=success after the parent runs. The write goes through
sudo() + mail_create_nolog=True. Any exception in the audit path is
caught and logged but never propagates — a broken audit table must
never block a real user from logging in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single helper builds vals for fusion.login.audit rows from the live
HTTP request, or falls back to ip=''internal'' + geo_lookup_state=''internal''
when there is no request. Parses UA into browser/os/device_type via the
bundled user_agents library. Never reads credential[''password'']. Tests
cover: no-request fallback, UA parsing on a Chrome/Windows UA, and the
regression that no password value leaks into the vals dict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
