Code-review findings on Phase A (Tablet PIN Session Redesign):
I1: Security XML comment now honestly describes the kiosk as Internal
User + explicit reads, not 'near-zero ACL'. base.group_user is kept
(required for auth='user' HTTP routes to function) but the comment
no longer overstates how locked-down the kiosk is.
I2: New ir.rule scopes the kiosk's ir.config_parameter read to keys
matching 'fp.tablet.%' or 'fp.shopfloor.%'. Combined with the
existing model-level read ACL, kiosk can no longer enumerate
third-party secrets (e.g. fusion_tasks.vapid_private_key) or
arbitrary API keys stored in ICP.
I3: post-migrate docstring now advises sysadmins to unlink the
plaintext ICP password row after kiosk tablets are paired, to
minimise plaintext-in-backups risk. Rotation procedure documented.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Generates a random kiosk password on first deploy, stores in
ir.config_parameter for sysadmin retrieval. Idempotent — re-runs
on subsequent -u leave the password alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
