Overrides res.users._login. When the login string does not resolve to
any user, super() raises AccessDenied; we record a row with user_id=NULL
and failure_reason="unknown_user", then re-raise. Closes the gap where
typo'd or scanned logins would otherwise vanish from the audit trail.
The existing _fc_record_login_event helper writes through an independent
registry.cursor(), so the audit row survives the rollback that follows
the re-raised AccessDenied.
Note: in Odoo 19 _login is a plain instance method (not the classmethod
it was in earlier versions) and takes (credential, user_agent_env). The
original plan was written for the classmethod signature; corrected here
and recorded in CLAUDE.md rule #10 so future-Claude does not waste time
re-discovering it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wraps res.users._check_credentials. On AccessDenied, records a row with
result=failure and failure_reason='bad_password' (or '2fa_failed' when
credential['type'] == 'totp'), then re-raises. Regression test asserts
the attempted password value never lands in any audit field.
The audit row is written through registry.cursor() (independent cursor) so
it survives the rollback that follows AccessDenied — in production
odoo/service/model.py::retrying resets the transaction and http.py closes
the cursor without committing, in tests assertRaises opens its own
savepoint. Either way an inline write would vanish. Tests
enter registry_test_mode and use manual try/except to keep the audit row
visible across the savepoint hierarchy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Overrides res.users._update_last_login to create a fusion.login.audit
row with result=success after the parent runs. The write goes through
sudo() + mail_create_nolog=True. Any exception in the audit path is
caught and logged but never propagates — a broken audit table must
never block a real user from logging in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single helper builds vals for fusion.login.audit rows from the live
HTTP request, or falls back to ip=''internal'' + geo_lookup_state=''internal''
when there is no request. Parses UA into browser/os/device_type via the
bundled user_agents library. Never reads credential[''password'']. Tests
cover: no-request fallback, UA parsing on a Chrome/Windows UA, and the
regression that no password value leaks into the vals dict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- All 16 columns per spec (user, attempted_login, result, failure_reason,
event_time, ip/geo fields, user_agent triple, device_type, database).
- Check constraint binds failure_reason presence to result value.
- Three composite indexes (user+time, login+time, geo_state+time) supporting
the per-user, failure-burst, and geo cron queries.
- Minimal admin-read ACL added so subsequent tests can verify writes.
- 3 TransactionCase tests passing: model create, failure_reason nullable on
success, geo_lookup_state='internal' accepted.
Odoo 19 deprecation note: this implementation uses the declarative
models.Constraint and models.Index attributes (Odoo 19 silently drops the
legacy `_sql_constraints = [...]` list and `init()`/raw-SQL pattern with
only a warning). Captured in CLAUDE.md rule #9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Empty installable module with manifest, package inits, and icon.
Subsequent tasks add the audit model, hooks, views, and tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
