fix(fusion_login_audit): avoid duplicate row on bad-password

When the login string resolves to an existing user and the password is
wrong, BOTH overrides used to write a failure row:
  - _check_credentials wrapper: result=failure, reason=bad_password
  - _login wrapper (catching the propagating AccessDenied): result=
    failure, reason=unknown_user

Discovered in production smoke on westin-v19 after the deploy: a
single failed login for info@gsafinancialconsulting.com produced two
audit rows (one bad_password, one unknown_user). The unknown_user
label was wrong — the user IS in the system.

Fix: _login now checks whether the login string resolves to any user
BEFORE writing the unknown_user row. If yes, _check_credentials
already logged the attempt and _login skips. If no, the user lookup
in super() failed and _login is the only chance to log.

Regression test test_login_known_user_bad_password_single_row asserts
exactly one row per attempt and that the row carries bad_password
(not unknown_user) when the user exists.

30 tests green locally; production smoke on westin-v19 confirms:
one row per failed login, bad_password, IP 172.18.0.1 captured.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.gitignore

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Python bytecode
+__pycache__/
+*.py[cod]
+*$py.class
+
+# Editor / OS noise
+.DS_Store
+*.swp
+*.swo
+.vscode/
+.idea/
+
+# Odoo runtime
+*.pyc-tmp
+
+# Local-only diagnostic logs from test runs
+_test_*.log

CLAUDE.md

@@ -12,9 +12,24 @@
 3. **Backend OWL**: Use standalone `rpc()` from `@web/core/network/rpc`. NOT `useService("rpc")`. `static props = []` not `{}`.
 4. **HTTP routes**: `type="jsonrpc"` — NOT `type="json"` (deprecated).
 5. **res.config.settings**: Only boolean/integer/float/char/selection/many2one/datetime. NO Date fields.
+   **`config_parameter=` Boolean fields don't round-trip `False` as a string.** Odoo's `set_values()` calls `IrConfigParameter.set_param(key, value)`, and `set_param` deletes the row when `value` is falsy (False / None / empty). So writing `False` to a Boolean config field means the param no longer exists in `ir_config_parameter`; a subsequent `get_param(key)` returns the *default* (Python `False`), not `'False'`. Test like `self.assertFalse(ICP.get_param('...'))` — never `assertEqual(..., 'False')`. (Integer/Float/Char go through `repr(value)` / strip, so they DO persist as strings — `'90'`, `'0'`, etc.) Source: `odoo/addons/base/models/res_config.py::set_values` and `ir_config_parameter.py::set_param`.
 6. **res.groups**: NO `users` field, NO `category_id` field.
+   **res.users**: field was renamed `groups_id` → `group_ids` (also `all_group_ids` for implied). The plural form is gone; using `groups_id` raises `ValueError: Invalid field 'groups_id' in 'res.users'`.
+   **`ir.ui.view`**: same rename — view-level visibility gating uses `group_ids`, not `groups_id`. A record like `<field name="groups_id" eval="[(4, ref('base.group_system'))]"/>` on an `ir.ui.view` raises `ValueError: Invalid field 'groups_id' in 'ir.ui.view'` at module install. (The XML *attribute* `groups="base.group_system"` on form elements like `<page>`, `<button>`, `<field>` is unrelated and still works.)
+   **`ir.rule` `groups` field is additive, not restrictive.** A rule with `groups=[some_group]` applies ONLY to users in that group — it does NOT restrict non-members. So `domain_force=[(1,'=',1)]` + `groups=[base.group_system]` does NOT mean "only admins see rows"; it means "admins see all rows (and the rule is silent on everyone else)". Non-admins are gated by the ACL (`ir.model.access.csv`), not the rule. To truly restrict by group at the rule layer, pair a global rule (`groups=[]`, `domain_force=[(0,'=',1)]` = block-all baseline) with a group-scoped allow rule. Default to letting the ACL do the gating; use rules for row-level filters that ACLs cannot express.
 7. **Search views**: NO `group expand="0"` syntax.
 8. **SCSS imports**: `@import "./partial"` is FORBIDDEN in Odoo 19 custom SCSS. It prints a warning and silently falls back to the old cached bundle. Register every SCSS file (including `_partial.scss` tokens) as a separate entry in `web.assets_backend`. Put tokens first; Odoo concatenates bundle files so SCSS variables/mixins from the first file are visible to every later file.
+9. **SQL constraints & indexes**: Odoo 19 dropped `_sql_constraints = [(name, def, msg), ...]` and the `init()`/raw-SQL pattern. Both still parse but only emit a warning and are silently ignored. Use declarative class attributes instead:
+   ```python
+   _check_qty_positive = models.Constraint('CHECK (qty > 0)', 'Quantity must be positive.')
+   _user_time_idx = models.Index('(user_id, event_time DESC)')
+   ```
+   The attribute name after the leading underscore becomes the SQL object name suffix (`{table}_{suffix}`). `models.Index` accepts `DESC`, `WHERE` predicates, and `USING btree (...)`. Sources: `odoo/orm/model_classes.py` (warns at registry build), `odoo/orm/table_objects.py` (Constraint + Index classes).
+10. **`res.users._login` is an instance method in Odoo 19**, not a classmethod as in earlier versions. Signature is `def _login(self, credential, user_agent_env)` — there is no `db` parameter. Override it like any normal instance method (`super()._login(credential, user_agent_env)`). When called via `authenticate()` on an empty recordset, `self` carries the right env. Older recipes that build a separate `api.Environment` from `odoo.modules.registry.Registry(db)` no longer apply. Source: `odoo/addons/base/models/res_users.py:760`.
+11. **Inherited `ir.ui.view` records cannot have `groups`/`group_ids` on the record itself.** Odoo 19 raises `ParseError: Inherited view cannot have 'groups' defined on the record. Use 'groups' attributes inside the view definition` at install time. Move the gate to the inner XML nodes — every `<button>`, `<page>`, `<field>`, `<xpath>`, `<group>` etc. supports a `groups="base.group_system"` attribute. For an inherited form with a smart button + admin tab, put `groups=` on the button and the page individually; leave the `<record model="ir.ui.view">` clean.
+12. **`mail.template` QWeb/inline_template `ctx` IS `self.env.context`** — not a nested dict you can pass. `MailRenderMixin._render_eval_context()` sets `ctx = self.env.context`, so `ctx.get('foo')` in subject/body resolves to `env.context.get('foo')`. To pass dynamic data to a template, spread keys directly into the context: `tmpl.with_context(**my_data).send_mail(res_id, ...)`. Calling `tmpl.with_context(ctx=my_data)` puts the dict at `env.context['ctx']`, and the template's `ctx.get('foo')` becomes `env.context.get('foo')` → `None` (looks like a silent rendering bug — subject ends up blank).
+13. **`ir.cron` dropped `numbercall`** in Odoo 19. Old recipes set `<field name="numbercall">-1</field>` for "run forever"; that now raises `ValueError: Invalid field 'numbercall' in 'ir.cron'` at install time. Just omit the field — recurring crons keep running as long as `active=True`. Source: `odoo/addons/base/models/ir_cron.py` field list.
+14. **`cr.commit()` / `cr.rollback()` raise AssertionError inside `TransactionCase`** — they are NOT silent no-ops in Odoo 19. The test cursor explicitly refuses both ("Cannot commit or rollback a cursor from inside a test, this will lead to a broken cursor when trying to rollback the test. Please rollback to a specific savepoint instead..."). For cron/worker code that needs per-row isolation so one bad row doesn't roll back the whole batch, use `with self.env.cr.savepoint(): ...` inside the loop instead of `cr.commit()`. Savepoints work in both prod (under the outer cron transaction) and tests (under the outer test transaction). The cron transaction commits the whole batch when the method returns; in tests everything rolls back cleanly. Source: `odoo/sql_db.py::TestCursor.commit` and `Cursor.savepoint()`.
 
 15. **There is NO `sale.subscription` model in Odoo 19** (Enterprise `sale_subscription`). A subscription is a **`sale.order`** with `is_subscription=True`, `plan_id` → **`sale.subscription.plan`** (the recurrence), plus `subscription_state` / `next_invoice_date` / `recurring_monthly`. Any Many2one or relation that targets "a subscription" must point at `sale.order` (filter `domain=[('is_subscription','=',True)]`) — **not** `sale.subscription`, which does not exist and fails at install. The surviving `sale.subscription.*` records are only the plan + wizards/reports (`sale.subscription.plan`, `sale.subscription.report`, `sale.subscription.change.customer.wizard`, `sale.subscription.close.reason.wizard`). Verified on live `nexamain` (odoo-nexa, 19.0): `SELECT model FROM ir_model WHERE model LIKE 'sale.subscription%'`.
 

docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-26-fusion-login-audit-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+# Fusion Login Audit — Design Spec
+
+**Status:** Approved, ready for implementation planning
+**Date:** 2026-05-26
+**Author:** Brainstormed with the user (Gurpreet) for the Westin Healthcare Odoo 19 deployment
+**Target module path:** `K:\Github\Odoo-Modules\fusion_login_audit\`
+**Production deploy target:** `/opt/odoo/custom-addons/fusion_login_audit/` on `odoo-westin` (VM 101, worker1, 192.168.1.40)
+**Production DB:** `westin-v19` (Odoo 19, PostgreSQL)
+
+## Background and motivation
+
+A spot audit of user `info@gsafinancialconsulting.com` ("GSA Accounting", uid 63) revealed Odoo's built-in login tracking is effectively unusable for compliance:
+
+- `res.users.log` rows are pruned by the daily `_gc_user_logs` cron — only the most recent login per user survives. For GSA Accounting the entire history collapsed to a single row at `2026-04-22 20:24 EDT`.
+- `/var/log/odoo` on the production VM is empty because Odoo is configured at `log_level=warn` with stdout-only logging; INFO-level auth lines aren't captured anywhere.
+- The container's json log is 444 KB and rotates frequently — nothing about the user remains.
+- The existing `network_logger` module records outbound HTTP traffic from Odoo (uid=1 always), not user activity.
+
+Result: today there is **no durable record** of who logged in, when, from where, or how often. A user with `base.group_system` + Technical Features and no 2FA — like GSA Accounting — could be active for months without any reconstructable trail.
+
+This module closes that gap with a dedicated audit table that survives Odoo's GC, captures successful and failed authentications, surfaces results in the user form, and alerts admins on suspicious failure bursts.
+
+## Goals
+
+1. **Durable audit trail** of every password-authenticated login (success and failure) on `westin-v19`.
+2. **Per-user visibility** for Settings admins via a tab + smart button on `res.users`.
+3. **Failure-burst alerting** to admins on a configurable consecutive-failure threshold.
+4. **Geo-enrichment** of IPs out-of-band so authentication latency is unaffected.
+5. **Zero risk to the auth path** — an audit-write failure must never block a real login.
+
+## Non-goals (v1)
+
+- Logging every HTTP request / page view (explicitly de-scoped during brainstorming).
+- Logging session resume events from auth cookies.
+- API-key authentication (`credential['type'] == 'apikey'`) — bypasses `_check_credentials`. Documented as a known gap; addressable in a follow-up.
+- OAuth / SSO logins — no OAuth provider configured on westin-v19.
+- Self-service "view my own login activity" for end users — visibility is admin-only.
+- Auto-disabling users on failed logins — flagged as a self-service DoS vector during brainstorming.
+
+## Architecture overview
+
+```
+┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
+│                       Odoo authentication path                       │
+│                                                                      │
+│   /web/login → res.users._login() → res.users._check_credentials()  │
+│                                  ↓                                   │
+│                          (on success)                                │
+│                                  ↓                                   │
+│                    res.users._update_last_login()                    │
+│                                  ↓                                   │
+│             ┌────────────────────┴────────────────────┐              │
+│             │                                          │              │
+│             ▼                                          ▼              │
+│  fusion.login.audit (sudo create)        Odoo's existing res_users_log │
+│  result='success' + IP + UA                                          │
+│                                                                      │
+│   (on AccessDenied)                                                  │
+│             ↓                                                        │
+│  fusion.login.audit (sudo create)                                    │
+│  result='failure' + failure_reason + attempted_login                 │
+│             ↓                                                        │
+│  _fc_recent_failure_count() >= threshold?                            │
+│             ↓ yes                                                    │
+│  _fc_send_failure_alert() → mail.mail to base.group_system           │
+└──────────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘
+                                    │
+              ┌─────────────────────┼─────────────────────┐
+              ▼                     ▼                     ▼
+   cron: cron_geo_enrich   cron: cron_retention_gc    UI surfaces:
+   every 5 min             daily 03:00 UTC            - smart button on res.users
+   - reverse DNS           - delete rows older than   - "Login Activity" tab
+   - ip-api.com lookup       x_fc_login_audit_        - Settings → Technical →
+   - 30-day local cache      retention_days             Login Audit menus
+                                                       - Settings page section
+```
+
+The auth-path hooks are synchronous (must run inside the request). Geolocation, alerting, and retention are out-of-band so they cannot affect login latency.
+
+## Module skeleton
+
+```
+fusion_login_audit/
+├── __manifest__.py
+├── __init__.py
+├── models/
+│   ├── __init__.py
+│   ├── res_users.py              # extends res.users with capture hooks + computed fields + smart-button action
+│   ├── fusion_login_audit.py     # the new audit record model
+│   └── res_config_settings.py    # alert threshold + window + retention settings
+├── data/
+│   ├── ir_cron_data.xml          # cron_geo_enrich + cron_retention_gc
+│   └── mail_template_data.xml    # failed-login alert template
+├── security/
+│   ├── security.xml              # record rule: read for base.group_system only
+│   └── ir.model.access.csv
+├── views/
+│   ├── fusion_login_audit_views.xml   # list / form / kanban / search
+│   ├── res_users_views.xml            # tab + smart button
+│   ├── res_config_settings_views.xml  # Settings section
+│   └── menus.xml                       # Settings → Technical → Login Audit
+├── tests/
+│   ├── __init__.py
+│   ├── test_login_audit.py
+│   └── test_security.py
+└── static/
+    └── description/
+        └── icon.png              # copied from C:\Users\gsing\Downloads\fusion logs.png
+```
+
+**Manifest highlights**
+
+- `version='19.0.1.0.0'` (project naming convention)
+- `license='OPL-1'` (matches `fusion_accounts`)
+- `depends=['base', 'mail']`
+- `category='Tools'`
+- `application=False` (it's a technical addon, not a top-level app)
+
+**Dependencies (Python):** none new. Uses the `user_agents` library already shipped with Odoo. Geolocation calls `http://ip-api.com/json/<ip>` via the standard `requests` library (no API key required, 45 req/min free tier).
+
+**Field naming:** new fields on existing models (`res.users`, `res.config.settings`) use the `x_fc_*` prefix per project CLAUDE.md. The new `fusion.login.audit` model uses unprefixed field names.
+
+## Data model
+
+### `fusion.login.audit` (new model, table `fusion_login_audit`)
+
+| Field | Type | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `user_id` | Many2one(`res.users`, `ondelete='set null'`) | Null if attempted login didn't match any user |
+| `attempted_login` | Char(255), indexed | Always set — even on unknown-user failures |
+| `result` | Selection(`success`, `failure`) | Indexed |
+| `failure_reason` | Selection(`bad_password`, `unknown_user`, `disabled_user`, `2fa_failed`, `other`) | Null on success |
+| `event_time` | Datetime, indexed, default `fields.Datetime.now()` | UTC; displayed in user TZ via standard widget |
+| `ip_address` | Char(45) | IPv6-safe length |
+| `ip_hostname` | Char(255) | Reverse DNS, populated by geo cron |
+| `country_code` | Char(2), indexed | ISO-3166-1 alpha-2; null until cron runs |
+| `country_name` | Char(64) | |
+| `city` | Char(128) | |
+| `geo_state` | Char(64) | Region/state name |
+| `geo_lookup_state` | Selection(`pending`, `done`, `private_ip`, `internal`, `failed`) | Drives the geo cron worklist; `internal` = no HTTP request was attached |
+| `user_agent_raw` | Char(512) | The full UA header |
+| `browser` | Char(64) | e.g. "Chrome 140" — parsed |
+| `os` | Char(64) | e.g. "Windows 11" — parsed |
+| `device_type` | Selection(`desktop`, `mobile`, `tablet`, `bot`, `unknown`) | From `user_agents` |
+| `database` | Char(64) | Multi-DB safety — which DB was logged into |
+
+**Indexes (in addition to the column-level `indexed=True`):**
+- `(user_id, event_time DESC)` — per-user history
+- `(attempted_login, event_time DESC)` — failure-burst detection by login string
+- `(geo_lookup_state, event_time)` — cron worklist
+
+**No `_inherit = ['mail.thread']`** — audit rows are append-only and should not have chatter.
+
+### `res.users` additions (per CLAUDE.md `x_fc_*` convention)
+
+| Field | Type | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `x_fc_login_audit_ids` | One2many(`fusion.login.audit`, `user_id`) | Backs the tab + smart-button count |
+| `x_fc_login_audit_count` | Integer, compute, store=False | Smart-button label |
+| `x_fc_last_successful_login` | Datetime, compute, store=True | Indexed; cheap "last seen" lookup |
+| `x_fc_last_login_ip` | Char(45), compute, store=True | Surfaces last source IP in the form header |
+
+The `store=True` computes are triggered by the create on `fusion.login.audit` (via `@api.depends('x_fc_login_audit_ids.event_time', 'x_fc_login_audit_ids.result')`).
+
+### `res.config.settings` additions
+
+Booleans / integers only (per CLAUDE.md — no Date fields on settings):
+
+| Field | Default | Notes |
+|---|---|---|
+| `x_fc_login_audit_retention_days` | 365 | Retention GC cron honors this; 0 = keep forever |
+| `x_fc_login_audit_alert_threshold` | 5 | Consecutive failures before alert |
+| `x_fc_login_audit_alert_window_min` | 15 | Time window in minutes for "consecutive" |
+| `x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled` | True | Master kill-switch for alert emails |
+
+Each is backed by an `ir.config_parameter` (`fusion_login_audit.retention_days`, etc.) so changes from the Settings page persist.
+
+### Multi-company
+
+`fusion.login.audit` is intentionally **company-agnostic**. Logins happen before any company context is established; synthesizing one would either break the unknown-user case or require a "system company" placeholder. Settings admins see all rows globally.
+
+## Capture flow
+
+### Successful login (`_update_last_login`)
+
+```python
+def _update_last_login(self):
+    result = super()._update_last_login()
+    try:
+        self._fc_record_login_event(result='success')
+    except Exception:
+        _logger.exception("fusion_login_audit: failed to record success row for %s", self.login)
+    return result
+```
+
+Called by Odoo only after the credential check has passed. Super() runs first so Odoo's own bookkeeping is unaffected.
+
+### Failed login on known user (`_check_credentials`)
+
+```python
+def _check_credentials(self, credential, env):
+    try:
+        return super()._check_credentials(credential, env)
+    except AccessDenied:
+        try:
+            self._fc_record_login_failure(credential, reason='bad_password')
+            if self._fc_recent_failure_count(credential) >= self._fc_alert_threshold():
+                self._fc_send_failure_alert(credential)
+        except Exception:
+            _logger.exception("fusion_login_audit: failed to record/alert failure")
+        raise
+```
+
+TOTP failures (from `auth_totp`) also raise `AccessDenied` and are caught here. Distinguish via `credential.get('type') == 'totp'` to set `failure_reason='2fa_failed'`.
+
+### Failed login on unknown user (`_login` classmethod)
+
+```python
+@classmethod
+def _login(cls, db, credential, user_agent_env):
+    try:
+        return super()._login(db, credential, user_agent_env)
+    except AccessDenied:
+        try:
+            cls._fc_record_unknown_user_failure(db, credential, user_agent_env)
+        except Exception:
+            _logger.exception("fusion_login_audit: failed to record unknown-user failure")
+        raise
+```
+
+Without this override, unknown-user attempts never reach `_check_credentials` and would silently disappear from the audit. The classmethod sets `user_id=None` and stores the attempted login string.
+
+### Context extraction (`_fc_build_event_vals`)
+
+Single helper shared by all three paths:
+
+```python
+def _fc_build_event_vals(self, result, attempted_login, failure_reason=None):
+    from odoo.http import request
+    vals = {
+        'attempted_login': attempted_login,
+        'result': result,
+        'failure_reason': failure_reason,
+        'event_time': fields.Datetime.now(),
+        'database': self.env.cr.dbname,
+        'geo_lookup_state': 'pending',
+    }
+    if request and request.httprequest:
+        vals['ip_address'] = request.httprequest.remote_addr  # respects proxy_mode
+        ua_str = request.httprequest.user_agent.string or ''
+        vals['user_agent_raw'] = ua_str[:512]
+        from user_agents import parse as ua_parse
+        ua = ua_parse(ua_str)
+        vals['browser'] = f"{ua.browser.family} {ua.browser.version_string}"[:64]
+        vals['os'] = f"{ua.os.family} {ua.os.version_string}"[:64]
+        vals['device_type'] = (
+            'mobile' if ua.is_mobile else
+            'tablet' if ua.is_tablet else
+            'bot' if ua.is_bot else
+            'desktop' if ua.is_pc else 'unknown'
+        )
+    else:
+        vals['ip_address'] = 'internal'
+        vals['user_agent_raw'] = '<no-request>'
+        vals['geo_lookup_state'] = 'internal'  # distinct from private_ip; cron skips both
+    return vals
+```
+
+### Write semantics
+
+- All writes use `self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().create(vals)` — low-privilege users can still generate their own audit rows despite the read-only record rule.
+- `mail_create_nolog=True` context to avoid chatter noise.
+- The password value is **never** present in `vals` and is hard-stripped from any `credential` dict before logging. A regression test asserts this.
+
+## Async geolocation cron (`cron_geo_enrich`)
+
+**Schedule:** every 5 minutes, `numbercall=-1`, `priority=10`.
+
+**Worker logic:**
+
+1. Select 100 oldest rows where `geo_lookup_state='pending'`.
+2. For each row:
+   - **Private-IP shortcut:** if `ip_address` is in `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`, or `fe80::/10` → set `geo_lookup_state='private_ip'`, `country_code='--'`, `city='Private network'`.
+   - **Cache check:** look for any prior row with the same `ip_address` and `country_code IS NOT NULL` and `event_time > now() - interval '30 days'`. If found, copy `country_code` / `country_name` / `city` / `geo_state` / `ip_hostname` locally; set state `done`. No external call.
+   - **Reverse DNS:** `socket.gethostbyaddr(ip)` with `socket.setdefaulttimeout(1.5)`.
+   - **HTTP lookup:** `requests.get('http://ip-api.com/json/' + ip, params={'fields': 'status,country,countryCode,regionName,city'}, timeout=3, headers={'User-Agent': 'Odoo-FusionLoginAudit/19.0'})`. The call passes through `network_logger` automatically.
+   - On `status='success'` → fill fields, set state `done`.
+   - On HTTP error, timeout, or `status='fail'` → set state `failed` (no retry).
+3. `self.env.cr.commit()` after each row so one bad IP cannot roll back the batch.
+4. **Rate limit defense:** if the response header `X-Rl` is `'0'`, break early and leave remaining rows as `pending` for the next run.
+
+**Privacy:** the only outbound data is the IP itself. No user identifiers, no Odoo URL, no headers beyond `User-Agent: Odoo-FusionLoginAudit/19.0`. All outbound calls are auditable in `network_logger`.
+
+## UI surfaces
+
+### `res.users` form view
+
+- **Smart button** in the button box, gated `groups="base.group_system"`:
+  ```
+  ┌──────────────┐
+  │ 🔑 N Logins  │
+  └──────────────┘
+  ```
+  Click → opens `fusion.login.audit` list view filtered to this user (`domain=[('user_id', '=', active_id)]`).
+- **New tab "Login Activity"** appended after existing tabs, gated `groups="base.group_system"`:
+  - Header summary: `x_fc_last_successful_login`, `x_fc_last_login_ip` (readonly).
+  - Embedded one2many tree on `x_fc_login_audit_ids`, `limit="30"`, columns: `event_time`, `result` (colored badge), `ip_address`, `country_code` (with flag emoji display), `browser`, `os`, `failure_reason`.
+  - Tree is `create="false" edit="false" delete="false"`.
+  - "View full history →" button below the tree, same action as the smart button.
+
+### Standalone views for `fusion.login.audit`
+
+- **List view:** `event_time`, `user_id` (clickable), `attempted_login` (only when `user_id IS NULL`), `result` badge, `ip_address`, `country_code`, `city`, `browser`, `device_type`. Default sort `event_time DESC`.
+- **Search view:** filters for "Successes", "Failures", "Last 24h", "Last 7d", "Last 30d", "Unknown users (no user_id)"; group-by IP / country / user.
+- **Form view:** readonly; collapsible "Raw" section for `user_agent_raw`, `ip_hostname`, `database`, `geo_lookup_state`.
+- **Kanban view:** grouped by `result`, color-coded green/red.
+
+### Menus
+
+Under **Settings → Technical → Login Audit**:
+- "Login Events" → default list view
+- "Failed Logins (24h)" → list view with default `[('result', '=', 'failure'), ('event_time', '>=', context_today() - 1)]`
+
+### Settings page
+
+New "Login Audit" section in **Settings → General Settings** (gated `groups="base.group_system"`):
+- "Retention period (days)" — integer, help: "0 = keep forever"
+- "Alert threshold" — integer
+- "Alert window (minutes)" — integer
+- "Send failed-login alerts" — boolean
+
+## Security
+
+### Group
+
+No new group created. Read is bound to existing `base.group_system`. Rationale: brainstorming decision was "Settings admins only" — reusing the existing group avoids an extra checkbox to manage.
+
+### Model access (`ir.model.access.csv`)
+
+| Group | Read | Write | Create | Unlink |
+|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `base.group_system` | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
+
+**No write/create/unlink for any group via the UI.** Audit rows are only written via `sudo()` from inside the auth hooks. An audit log admins can mutate is not an audit log.
+
+### Record rule
+
+Single global rule on `fusion.login.audit`: read for `base.group_system` only. The user-form one2many is additionally gated at the view level via `groups="base.group_system"` (not via a more permissive record rule) so non-admins have no read path even if they craft a custom view.
+
+### Field-level
+
+- `failure_reason` stores a category, never the attempted password.
+- `_fc_build_event_vals` strips `credential['password']` before any logging or row construction.
+- The `credential` dict is never persisted.
+- Regression test: no field on `fusion.login.audit` ever contains a known-test-password string.
+
+## Retention
+
+**Cron `cron_retention_gc`** — daily at 03:00 UTC, `numbercall=-1`:
+
+```python
+days = int(self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo().get_param(
+    'fusion_login_audit.retention_days', 365))
+if days > 0:
+    cutoff = fields.Datetime.now() - timedelta(days=days)
+    self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().search([
+        ('event_time', '<', cutoff)
+    ]).unlink()
+```
+
+Uses `unlink()` rather than raw `DELETE` so any ORM side effects fire. Expected DB load on `westin-v19`: 27 users × ~2 logins/day × 365 days ≈ 20k rows steady state — trivial for Postgres.
+
+## Failed-login alert
+
+**Mail template** in `data/mail_template_data.xml`:
+
+- **Subject:** `[Login Audit] {threshold} failed login attempts for {attempted_login}`
+- **Body:** simple HTML table of the last N failure rows for that `attempted_login` — timestamp, IP, country, user-agent summary.
+- **Recipients:** all users in `base.group_system` with a non-empty `email`.
+- **Send path:** `mail.mail` queue with `auto_delete=True` so the auth response isn't blocked.
+
+**Cooldown:** 60 min per `attempted_login`, enforced via an `ir.config_parameter` keyed by `fusion_login_audit.last_alert:{attempted_login}` storing the last-send timestamp. Prevents a sustained attack from flooding admin inboxes.
+
+**Kill-switch:** if `x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled = False`, no alerts are sent regardless of threshold.
+
+## Edge cases
+
+| Case | Behavior |
+|---|---|
+| `request` is None (XML-RPC, internal auth from cron) | Row written with `ip_address='internal'`, `user_agent_raw='<no-request>'`, `geo_lookup_state='internal'` (cron skips) |
+| Audit insert errors on a hot DB | Login still succeeds — every auth-path hook is wrapped in `try/except Exception: _logger.exception(...)` |
+| User deleted while audit rows remain | `ondelete='set null'` preserves history; `attempted_login` keeps the readable identifier |
+| Password reset / `auth_signup` | The reset itself generates no login event; the subsequent login does — matches expectation |
+| API key authentication | **Out of scope v1** (bypasses `_check_credentials`); documented |
+| OAuth / SSO | Out of scope v1; no provider configured on westin-v19 |
+| Portal user (`share=True`) | Logged the same way; smart button remains admin-visible |
+| Two requests racing on the same private IP | Each writes its own row; geo cache is best-effort, not transactional |
+| `proxy_mode = False` in `odoo.conf` | `remote_addr` will be the reverse-proxy IP — known limitation, fixable by setting `proxy_mode = True` (out of scope) |
+
+## Testing
+
+### `tests/test_login_audit.py` (TransactionCase)
+
+1. Successful login writes a row with `result='success'` and resolved `user_id`.
+2. Bad password writes `result='failure'` with `failure_reason='bad_password'` and re-raises `AccessDenied`.
+3. Unknown user writes `result='failure'` with `failure_reason='unknown_user'`, `user_id=None`, non-null `attempted_login`.
+4. No field on the written row contains the attempted password (regression).
+5. Geo cron: pending row gets enriched from local cache when same IP exists within 30 days (no HTTP call made).
+6. Retention cron: rows older than `retention_days` are deleted; newer survive.
+7. Alert email: 5 failures in 15 min queues exactly one `mail.mail`; a 6th failure within cooldown queues zero.
+8. `database` field is populated from `self.env.cr.dbname`.
+9. Audit-write exception inside `_update_last_login` does not block the login.
+
+### `tests/test_security.py` (HttpCase)
+
+1. Non-admin user gets `AccessError` on direct `search(fusion.login.audit)`.
+2. Non-admin sees the user form view without the smart button or "Login Activity" tab (XML node hidden by `groups`).
+3. Settings admin sees both.
+
+## Deployment notes
+
+- **Local install:** copy module to `K:\Github\Odoo-Modules\fusion_login_audit\` (bind-mounted into `odoo-modsdev-app` container). Update via:
+  ```
+  docker exec odoo-modsdev-app odoo -d fusion-dev -i fusion_login_audit --stop-after-init
+  ```
+- **Production install:** sync to `/opt/odoo/custom-addons/fusion_login_audit/` on odoo-westin (via `auto_sync.sh` or git pull on the VM). Update via:
+  ```
+  ssh odoo-westin "docker exec odoo-dev-app odoo -d westin-v19 -i fusion_login_audit --stop-after-init"
+  ```
+- **Icon:** copy `C:\Users\gsing\Downloads\fusion logs.png` to `K:\Github\Odoo-Modules\fusion_login_audit\static\description\icon.png`.
+- **Verify `proxy_mode = True`** in `/opt/odoo/odoo.conf` on odoo-westin before relying on `ip_address` accuracy — otherwise `remote_addr` will be the reverse-proxy IP rather than the real client. Confirmed out of scope for this module, but flag for the operator.
+- **Verify outbound to `ip-api.com:80`** is reachable from the odoo-westin VM (Tailscale/firewall) — if blocked, `geo_lookup_state` will simply be `failed` and the rest of the module is unaffected.
+
+## Success criteria
+
+- Logging in as any user creates exactly one `fusion.login.audit` row with `result='success'` and the correct IP/UA.
+- Failed login attempts create exactly one row with `result='failure'` and the correct `failure_reason`.
+- Unknown-user attempts create a row with `user_id=None` and the typed login string in `attempted_login`.
+- The smart button on `res.users` shows the lifetime count and opens the filtered list.
+- The "Login Activity" tab shows the last 30 events with correct color coding.
+- After 5 failures from the same login string within 15 minutes, exactly one alert email arrives in the inbox of every Settings admin with an `email` set.
+- The geo cron populates `country_code`, `city`, `ip_hostname` for public IPs within 10 minutes of the login.
+- The retention cron, set to 1 day for a test, deletes rows older than 24 hours and leaves newer ones.
+- All tests pass: `docker exec odoo-modsdev-app odoo -d fusion-dev --test-enable -i fusion_login_audit --stop-after-init`.

fusion_login_audit/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from . import models

fusion_login_audit/__manifest__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+# Copyright 2026 Nexa Systems Inc.
+# License OPL-1 (Odoo Proprietary License v1.0)
+{
+    'name': 'Fusion Login Audit',
+    'version': '19.0.1.0.0',
+    'category': 'Tools',
+    'summary': 'Durable login audit log with geo-enrichment, retention, and failure alerts.',
+    'description': """
+Fusion Login Audit
+==================
+
+Captures every password authentication event (success + failure) in a
+dedicated, append-only audit table. Surfaces history on the user form
+as a smart button + tab (admins only). Async-enriches IPs with country,
+city, and reverse DNS. Emails Settings admins on consecutive-failure
+bursts. Daily retention cron honours a configurable horizon.
+    """,
+    'author': 'Nexa Systems Inc.',
+    'website': 'https://nexasystems.ca',
+    'license': 'OPL-1',
+    'depends': ['base', 'mail', 'base_setup'],
+    'external_dependencies': {
+        'python': ['user_agents'],
+    },
+    'data': [
+        'security/ir.model.access.csv',
+        'security/security.xml',
+        'data/mail_template_data.xml',
+        'data/ir_cron_data.xml',
+        'views/fusion_login_audit_views.xml',
+        'views/res_users_views.xml',
+        'views/res_config_settings_views.xml',
+        'views/menus.xml',
+    ],
+    'installable': True,
+    'application': False,
+    'auto_install': False,
+}

fusion_login_audit/data/ir_cron_data.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+    <data noupdate="1">
+
+        <record id="cron_retention_gc" model="ir.cron">
+            <field name="name">Fusion Login Audit: Retention GC</field>
+            <field name="model_id" ref="model_fusion_login_audit"/>
+            <field name="state">code</field>
+            <field name="code">model._fc_retention_gc()</field>
+            <field name="interval_number">1</field>
+            <field name="interval_type">days</field>
+            <field name="active" eval="True"/>
+        </record>
+
+        <record id="cron_geo_enrich" model="ir.cron">
+            <field name="name">Fusion Login Audit: Geo Enrichment</field>
+            <field name="model_id" ref="model_fusion_login_audit"/>
+            <field name="state">code</field>
+            <field name="code">model._fc_geo_enrich_pending(limit=100)</field>
+            <field name="interval_number">5</field>
+            <field name="interval_type">minutes</field>
+            <field name="active" eval="True"/>
+            <field name="priority">10</field>
+        </record>
+
+    </data>
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/data/mail_template_data.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+    <data noupdate="1">
+
+        <record id="mail_template_failure_burst" model="mail.template">
+            <field name="name">Fusion Login Audit — Failure Burst Alert</field>
+            <field name="model_id" ref="base.model_res_users"/>
+            <field name="subject">[Login Audit] Failed login attempts for {{ ctx.get('attempted_login') }}</field>
+            <field name="body_html" type="html">
+<div>
+    <p>The login audit detected
+        <strong t-out="ctx.get('failure_count')"/> failed login attempt(s)
+        in the last <t t-out="ctx.get('window_min')"/> minute(s) for
+        <strong t-out="ctx.get('attempted_login')"/>.</p>
+    <p>Most recent attempts:</p>
+    <table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0"
+           style="border-collapse: collapse; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 12px;">
+        <thead style="background: #f3f4f6;">
+            <tr>
+                <th>Time</th>
+                <th>IP</th>
+                <th>Country</th>
+                <th>Browser</th>
+                <th>OS</th>
+            </tr>
+        </thead>
+        <tbody>
+            <tr t-foreach="ctx.get('rows', [])" t-as="row">
+                <td t-out="row['event_time']"/>
+                <td t-out="row['ip_address']"/>
+                <td t-out="row.get('country_code') or ''"/>
+                <td t-out="row.get('browser') or ''"/>
+                <td t-out="row.get('os') or ''"/>
+            </tr>
+        </tbody>
+    </table>
+    <p style="color: #6b7280; font-size: 11px;">
+        Sent by Fusion Login Audit. Tune the threshold and window in
+        Settings → General Settings → Login Audit.
+    </p>
+</div>
+            </field>
+        </record>
+
+    </data>
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/models/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from . import fusion_login_audit
+from . import res_users
+from . import res_config_settings

fusion_login_audit/models/fusion_login_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+import ipaddress
+import logging
+import socket
+from datetime import timedelta
+
+import requests
+
+from odoo import api, fields, models
+
+_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+class FusionLoginAudit(models.Model):
+    _name = 'fusion.login.audit'
+    _description = 'Login Audit Event'
+    _order = 'event_time desc, id desc'
+    _rec_name = 'attempted_login'
+
+    user_id = fields.Many2one(
+        'res.users', string='User', ondelete='set null', index=True,
+        help='Null when the attempted login did not match any user.',
+    )
+    attempted_login = fields.Char(
+        string='Attempted Login', size=255, required=True, index=True,
+    )
+    result = fields.Selection(
+        [('success', 'Success'), ('failure', 'Failure')],
+        string='Result', required=True, index=True,
+    )
+    failure_reason = fields.Selection(
+        [
+            ('bad_password', 'Bad password'),
+            ('unknown_user', 'Unknown user'),
+            ('disabled_user', 'Disabled user'),
+            ('2fa_failed', '2FA failed'),
+            ('other', 'Other'),
+        ],
+        string='Failure Reason',
+    )
+    event_time = fields.Datetime(
+        string='Event Time', required=True, index=True,
+        default=fields.Datetime.now,
+    )
+    ip_address = fields.Char(string='IP Address', size=45)
+    ip_hostname = fields.Char(string='Reverse DNS', size=255)
+    country_code = fields.Char(string='Country Code', size=2, index=True)
+    country_name = fields.Char(string='Country', size=64)
+    city = fields.Char(string='City', size=128)
+    geo_state = fields.Char(string='Region', size=64)
+    geo_lookup_state = fields.Selection(
+        [
+            ('pending', 'Pending'),
+            ('done', 'Done'),
+            ('private_ip', 'Private IP'),
+            ('internal', 'Internal (no request)'),
+            ('failed', 'Lookup failed'),
+        ],
+        string='Geo Lookup State', default='pending', index=True,
+    )
+    user_agent_raw = fields.Char(string='User Agent', size=512)
+    browser = fields.Char(string='Browser', size=64)
+    os = fields.Char(string='OS', size=64)
+    device_type = fields.Selection(
+        [
+            ('desktop', 'Desktop'),
+            ('mobile', 'Mobile'),
+            ('tablet', 'Tablet'),
+            ('bot', 'Bot'),
+            ('unknown', 'Unknown'),
+        ],
+        string='Device Type', default='unknown',
+    )
+    database = fields.Char(string='Database', size=64)
+
+    # Odoo 19 replaces the legacy `_sql_constraints = [...]` list with
+    # declarative `models.Constraint` attributes. The plan template used the
+    # legacy form, which now only emits a warning and is silently dropped.
+    _result_failure_reason_consistent = models.Constraint(
+        "CHECK ((result = 'success' AND failure_reason IS NULL) "
+        "OR (result = 'failure' AND failure_reason IS NOT NULL))",
+        'A failure row must have a failure_reason; a success row must not.',
+    )
+
+    # Composite indexes supporting the three hot queries:
+    #   - per-user history       (user_id, event_time DESC)
+    #   - failure-burst by login (attempted_login, event_time DESC)
+    #   - geo cron worklist      (geo_lookup_state, event_time)
+    # Odoo 19 ships `models.Index` as the declarative replacement for the
+    # init()/raw-SQL pattern; the attribute name becomes the index suffix
+    # (e.g. `_user_time_idx` -> `fusion_login_audit_user_time_idx`).
+    _user_time_idx = models.Index('(user_id, event_time DESC)')
+    _login_time_idx = models.Index('(attempted_login, event_time DESC)')
+    _geo_state_idx = models.Index('(geo_lookup_state, event_time)')
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_retention_gc(self):
+        """Delete audit rows older than `fusion_login_audit.retention_days`.
+        Called daily by ir.cron. retention_days=0 means keep forever."""
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        try:
+            days = int(ICP.get_param(
+                'fusion_login_audit.retention_days', 365))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            days = 365
+        if days <= 0:
+            return 0
+        cutoff = fields.Datetime.now() - timedelta(days=days)
+        old = self.sudo().search([('event_time', '<', cutoff)])
+        count = len(old)
+        if old:
+            old.unlink()
+        return count
+
+    _FC_PRIVATE_NETWORKS = (
+        ipaddress.ip_network('10.0.0.0/8'),
+        ipaddress.ip_network('172.16.0.0/12'),
+        ipaddress.ip_network('192.168.0.0/16'),
+        ipaddress.ip_network('127.0.0.0/8'),
+        ipaddress.ip_network('::1/128'),
+        ipaddress.ip_network('fe80::/10'),
+    )
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_is_private_ip(self, ip):
+        if not ip or ip == 'internal':
+            return False  # 'internal' uses its own state
+        try:
+            addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
+        except ValueError:
+            return False
+        return any(addr in net for net in self._FC_PRIVATE_NETWORKS)
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_geo_cache_hit(self, ip):
+        """Return a dict of geo fields if we've resolved this IP in the last
+        30 days, else None."""
+        if not ip:
+            return None
+        cutoff = fields.Datetime.now() - timedelta(days=30)
+        cached = self.sudo().search([
+            ('ip_address', '=', ip),
+            ('geo_lookup_state', '=', 'done'),
+            ('event_time', '>=', cutoff),
+        ], limit=1, order='event_time desc')
+        if not cached:
+            return None
+        return {
+            'country_code': cached.country_code,
+            'country_name': cached.country_name,
+            'city': cached.city,
+            'geo_state': cached.geo_state,
+            'ip_hostname': cached.ip_hostname,
+        }
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_geo_reverse_dns(self, ip):
+        try:
+            socket.setdefaulttimeout(1.5)
+            host, _aliases, _ips = socket.gethostbyaddr(ip)
+            return (host or '')[:255]
+        except (socket.herror, socket.gaierror, OSError):
+            return ''
+        finally:
+            socket.setdefaulttimeout(None)
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_geo_http_lookup(self, ip):
+        """Call ip-api.com. Returns (vals_dict, rate_limited_bool).
+        Falls back to ({}, False) on any error."""
+        try:
+            resp = requests.get(
+                'http://ip-api.com/json/' + ip,
+                params={'fields': 'status,country,countryCode,regionName,city'},
+                timeout=3,
+                headers={'User-Agent': 'Odoo-FusionLoginAudit/19.0'},
+            )
+            rate_limited = resp.headers.get('X-Rl', '') == '0'
+            if resp.status_code != 200:
+                return ({}, rate_limited)
+            data = resp.json() or {}
+            if data.get('status') != 'success':
+                return ({}, rate_limited)
+            return ({
+                'country_code': (data.get('countryCode') or '')[:2],
+                'country_name': (data.get('country') or '')[:64],
+                'geo_state': (data.get('regionName') or '')[:64],
+                'city': (data.get('city') or '')[:128],
+            }, rate_limited)
+        except (requests.RequestException, ValueError):
+            _logger.warning("fusion_login_audit: geo lookup failed for %s",
+                            ip, exc_info=True)
+            return ({}, False)
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_geo_enrich_pending(self, limit=100):
+        """Cron worker: process up to `limit` pending rows.
+
+        Per-row isolation is provided by `cr.savepoint()` rather than
+        `cr.commit()`/`cr.rollback()` — the latter raises an AssertionError
+        inside a TransactionCase (Odoo's test cursor refuses commit/rollback).
+        Savepoints work in both prod and tests; the outer cron transaction
+        commits the lot once the method returns. One bad IP rolls back only
+        its own savepoint, so the rest of the batch still lands.
+        """
+        pending = self.sudo().search(
+            [('geo_lookup_state', '=', 'pending')],
+            order='event_time asc', limit=limit,
+        )
+        if not pending:
+            return 0
+        processed = 0
+        stop_after_this = False
+        for row in pending:
+            ip = row.ip_address
+            try:
+                with self.env.cr.savepoint():
+                    if self._fc_is_private_ip(ip):
+                        row.write({
+                            'geo_lookup_state': 'private_ip',
+                            'country_code': '--',
+                            'country_name': 'Private network',
+                            'city': 'Private network',
+                        })
+                        processed += 1
+                        continue
+
+                    cached = self._fc_geo_cache_hit(ip)
+                    if cached:
+                        cached['geo_lookup_state'] = 'done'
+                        row.write(cached)
+                        processed += 1
+                        continue
+
+                    hostname = self._fc_geo_reverse_dns(ip) if ip and ip != 'internal' else ''
+                    vals, rate_limited = self._fc_geo_http_lookup(ip) if ip and ip != 'internal' else ({}, False)
+                    if vals:
+                        vals['ip_hostname'] = hostname
+                        vals['geo_lookup_state'] = 'done'
+                        row.write(vals)
+                    else:
+                        row.write({
+                            'geo_lookup_state': 'failed',
+                            'ip_hostname': hostname,
+                        })
+                    processed += 1
+                    if rate_limited:
+                        _logger.info("fusion_login_audit: ip-api rate limit "
+                                     "hit, stopping batch early")
+                        stop_after_this = True
+            except Exception:
+                _logger.exception(
+                    "fusion_login_audit: geo enrich failed for row %s", row.id)
+            if stop_after_this:
+                break
+        return processed

fusion_login_audit/models/res_config_settings.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from odoo import fields, models
+
+
+class ResConfigSettings(models.TransientModel):
+    _inherit = 'res.config.settings'
+
+    x_fc_login_audit_retention_days = fields.Integer(
+        string='Login Audit Retention (days)',
+        default=365,
+        config_parameter='fusion_login_audit.retention_days',
+        help='Login audit rows older than this are deleted by the nightly '
+             'cron. Set to 0 to keep forever.',
+    )
+    x_fc_login_audit_alert_threshold = fields.Integer(
+        string='Alert After N Consecutive Failures',
+        default=5,
+        config_parameter='fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold',
+        help='When this many failures for the same attempted login occur '
+             'within the alert window, Settings admins receive one email.',
+    )
+    x_fc_login_audit_alert_window_min = fields.Integer(
+        string='Alert Window (minutes)',
+        default=15,
+        config_parameter='fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min',
+    )
+    x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled = fields.Boolean(
+        string='Send Failed-Login Alerts',
+        default=True,
+        config_parameter='fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled',
+    )

fusion_login_audit/models/res_users.py

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+import logging
+
+from odoo import _, api, fields, models
+from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+
+# Top-level import (vs lazy inside the method): if the dep is missing — most
+# likely because the dev container got recreated and dropped its pip install
+# (see CLAUDE.md Workflow) — Odoo crashes at registry load with a clear
+# `ModuleNotFoundError`, not deep in the auth path after the first login.
+from user_agents import parse as ua_parse
+
+_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+class ResUsers(models.Model):
+    _inherit = 'res.users'
+
+    @api.model
+    def _fc_build_event_vals(
+        self,
+        result,
+        attempted_login,
+        failure_reason=None,
+        user_id=None,
+        _override_ip=None,
+        _override_ua=None,
+        _credential=None,
+    ):
+        """Build the dict of values for a fusion.login.audit row.
+
+        Pulls IP / User-Agent from the live HTTP request when available.
+        Falls back to ('internal', '<no-request>') for XML-RPC / cron-initiated
+        auth, with geo_lookup_state='internal' so the geo cron skips them.
+
+        An empty IP from an otherwise-live request (rare; misconfigured
+        reverse proxy) also routes to the 'internal' fallback — an empty
+        string isn't useful audit data and is arguably suspicious.
+
+        The _override_* kwargs exist for tests so we don't have to fake a
+        full request. They are NOT a public API.
+
+        Password safety: `_credential` MAY contain a 'password' key from the
+        Odoo auth flow. We never read that key, never log it, never put it
+        in vals. The test `test_build_event_vals_strips_password` locks
+        this property in via `assertNotIn(secret, repr(vals))`.
+        """
+        vals = {
+            'attempted_login': (attempted_login or '')[:255],
+            'result': result,
+            'failure_reason': failure_reason,
+            'event_time': fields.Datetime.now(),
+            'database': self.env.cr.dbname,
+            'user_id': user_id,
+        }
+
+        ip = _override_ip
+        ua_str = _override_ua
+
+        if ip is None or ua_str is None:
+            try:
+                from odoo.http import request
+                if request and getattr(request, 'httprequest', None):
+                    if ip is None:
+                        ip = request.httprequest.remote_addr
+                    if ua_str is None:
+                        ua_str = request.httprequest.user_agent.string or ''
+            except Exception:
+                _logger.debug("fusion_login_audit: no request context", exc_info=True)
+
+        if ip and ua_str is not None:
+            ua_text = ua_str or ''
+            vals['ip_address'] = ip[:45]
+            vals['user_agent_raw'] = ua_text[:512]
+            ua = ua_parse(ua_text)
+            vals['browser'] = (f"{ua.browser.family} {ua.browser.version_string}".strip())[:64]
+            vals['os'] = (f"{ua.os.family} {ua.os.version_string}".strip())[:64]
+            if ua.is_bot:
+                vals['device_type'] = 'bot'
+            elif ua.is_mobile:
+                vals['device_type'] = 'mobile'
+            elif ua.is_tablet:
+                vals['device_type'] = 'tablet'
+            elif ua.is_pc:
+                vals['device_type'] = 'desktop'
+            else:
+                vals['device_type'] = 'unknown'
+            vals['geo_lookup_state'] = 'pending'
+        else:
+            vals['ip_address'] = 'internal'
+            vals['user_agent_raw'] = '<no-request>'
+            vals['device_type'] = 'unknown'
+            vals['geo_lookup_state'] = 'internal'
+
+        # _credential is accepted in the signature so callers (T6 _check_credentials,
+        # T7 _login) can hand the dict in without filtering. The helper deliberately
+        # touches NO keys from it — see the password-safety note in the docstring.
+        # `_credential` is intentionally unread here; the parameter exists so future
+        # work can read `credential.get('type')` for `2fa_failed` discrimination
+        # only via the explicit failure_reason kwarg, never from the dict directly.
+        del _credential  # explicit no-op — locks down the read surface
+
+        return vals
+
+    def _fc_record_login_event(self, result, failure_reason=None,
+                                user_id=None, attempted_login=None,
+                                _credential=None):
+        """Build vals + create the audit row via sudo. Never raises.
+
+        The row is written through an INDEPENDENT cursor
+        (``registry.cursor()``) so that:
+
+        * A failure-path call from ``_check_credentials`` survives the
+          outer transaction rollback that follows ``AccessDenied``
+          (the HTTP layer closes the cursor without committing, see
+          ``odoo/service/model.py:retrying``).
+        * A broken audit table can never block a real user from logging
+          in: the cursor block is wrapped in try/except; exceptions are
+          logged and swallowed.
+
+        The independent cursor commits on context exit. Note that this
+        means the row is durable even if the caller's transaction later
+        rolls back — intentional for audit semantics: a recorded bad
+        password should NOT disappear because some unrelated downstream
+        op blew up.
+        """
+        try:
+            vals = self._fc_build_event_vals(
+                result=result,
+                attempted_login=attempted_login
+                                or (self.login if self else None)
+                                or 'unknown',
+                failure_reason=failure_reason,
+                user_id=user_id or (self.id if self else None),
+                _credential=_credential,
+            )
+            with self.env.registry.cursor() as audit_cr:
+                audit_env = api.Environment(audit_cr, self.env.uid, self.env.context)
+                audit_env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().with_context(
+                    mail_create_nolog=True
+                ).create(vals)
+        except Exception:
+            _logger.exception(
+                "fusion_login_audit: failed to record %s row for %s",
+                result, attempted_login or (self.login if self else 'unknown'),
+            )
+
+    def _update_last_login(self):
+        result = super()._update_last_login()
+        # Self is the singleton recordset of the user that just logged in.
+        self._fc_record_login_event(result='success')
+        return result
+
+    def _fc_alert_threshold(self):
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        try:
+            return max(1, int(ICP.get_param(
+                'fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold', 5)))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            return 5
+
+    def _fc_alert_window_min(self):
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        try:
+            return max(1, int(ICP.get_param(
+                'fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min', 15)))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            return 15
+
+    def _fc_alert_enabled(self):
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        # CLAUDE.md rule #5: Boolean config_parameter deletes on False.
+        # An absent key means True (the default). Explicit 'False' or 'false'
+        # means disabled.
+        raw = ICP.get_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled', 'True')
+        return str(raw).strip().lower() != 'false'
+
+    def _fc_recent_failure_count(self, attempted_login):
+        """Failures for this attempted_login within the alert window."""
+        from datetime import timedelta
+        if not attempted_login:
+            return 0
+        cutoff = fields.Datetime.now() - timedelta(
+            minutes=self._fc_alert_window_min())
+        return self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().search_count([
+            ('attempted_login', '=', attempted_login),
+            ('result', '=', 'failure'),
+            ('event_time', '>=', cutoff),
+        ])
+
+    def _fc_send_failure_alert(self, attempted_login):
+        """Queue one alert mail unless cooldown is active. Cooldown is
+        60 minutes, keyed by attempted_login, stored in ir.config_parameter."""
+        from datetime import timedelta
+        if not self._fc_alert_enabled():
+            return
+        if not attempted_login:
+            return
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        cd_key = f'fusion_login_audit.last_alert:{attempted_login}'
+        cd_raw = ICP.get_param(cd_key)
+        now = fields.Datetime.now()
+        if cd_raw:
+            try:
+                last = fields.Datetime.from_string(cd_raw)
+                if last and (now - last) < timedelta(minutes=60):
+                    return  # cooldown active
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pass
+
+        window = self._fc_alert_window_min()
+        cutoff = now - timedelta(minutes=window)
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        rows = Audit.search([
+            ('attempted_login', '=', attempted_login),
+            ('result', '=', 'failure'),
+            ('event_time', '>=', cutoff),
+        ], order='event_time desc', limit=20)
+
+        # Admin recipients: members of base.group_system (the Settings group)
+        # who have an email set and are not portal/share users. Note:
+        # CLAUDE.md rule #6 — res.groups has no `users` field in Odoo 19, so
+        # search res.users by group_ids directly. The __system__ superuser
+        # (uid=1) is excluded automatically by Odoo's default user filter.
+        admins = self.env['res.users'].sudo().search([
+            ('group_ids', 'in', self.env.ref('base.group_system').id),
+            ('email', '!=', False),
+            ('share', '=', False),
+        ])
+        if not admins:
+            return
+
+        tmpl = self.env.ref(
+            'fusion_login_audit.mail_template_failure_burst',
+            raise_if_not_found=False)
+        if not tmpl:
+            return
+
+        # CLAUDE.md rule #12: in mail.template QWeb, `ctx` IS env.context.
+        # So `ctx.get('foo')` resolves to env.context.get('foo'). Pass data
+        # by SPREADING keys into the context, not wrapping in a dict.
+        # `with_context(ctx=ctx_data)` would silently render an empty subject.
+        ctx_data = {
+            'attempted_login': attempted_login,
+            'failure_count': len(rows),
+            'window_min': window,
+            'rows': [{
+                'event_time': fields.Datetime.to_string(r.event_time),
+                'ip_address': r.ip_address or '',
+                'country_code': r.country_code or '',
+                'browser': r.browser or '',
+                'os': r.os or '',
+            } for r in rows],
+        }
+        for admin in admins:
+            tmpl.with_context(**ctx_data).send_mail(
+                admin.id,
+                email_values={'email_to': admin.email,
+                              'auto_delete': True},
+                force_send=False,
+            )
+        ICP.set_param(cd_key, fields.Datetime.to_string(now))
+
+    def _check_credentials(self, credential, env):
+        try:
+            return super()._check_credentials(credential, env)
+        except AccessDenied:
+            cred_type = (credential or {}).get('type', 'password')
+            reason = '2fa_failed' if cred_type == 'totp' else 'bad_password'
+            attempted_login = (credential or {}).get('login') or self.login
+            self._fc_record_login_event(
+                result='failure',
+                failure_reason=reason,
+                user_id=self.id,
+                attempted_login=attempted_login,
+                _credential=credential,
+            )
+            try:
+                if self._fc_recent_failure_count(attempted_login) \
+                        >= self._fc_alert_threshold():
+                    self._fc_send_failure_alert(attempted_login)
+            except Exception:
+                _logger.exception(
+                    "fusion_login_audit: failed to send failure alert")
+            raise
+
+    def _login(self, credential, user_agent_env):
+        """Catch the unknown-user branch of upstream _login.
+
+        In Odoo 19 ``_login`` is an *instance* method (not a classmethod as in
+        earlier versions). Upstream raises ``AccessDenied`` in three cases:
+
+        1. Unknown login string — ``_assert_can_auth`` or the user-lookup
+           ``search()`` returns empty → ``_check_credentials`` never fires →
+           THIS override is the only chance to record the attempt.
+        2. Wrong password — user exists, ``_check_credentials`` raises →
+           our ``_check_credentials`` override already wrote a ``bad_password``
+           row → re-raise propagates up to here. We MUST NOT write a second
+           row.
+        3. 2FA failure — same as #2 but ``failure_reason='2fa_failed'``.
+
+        We distinguish #1 from #2/#3 by checking whether the login string
+        resolves to any user. If it does, ``_check_credentials`` ran (and
+        already logged); if it doesn't, the user lookup failed and we log
+        ``unknown_user`` here.
+
+        ``_fc_record_login_event`` writes through an INDEPENDENT cursor
+        (``self.env.registry.cursor()``), so the audit row survives the
+        outer transaction rollback that follows the re-raised
+        ``AccessDenied``. Audit-side exceptions never block the re-raise.
+        """
+        try:
+            return super()._login(credential, user_agent_env)
+        except AccessDenied:
+            login = (credential or {}).get('login') or ''
+            try:
+                user_exists = bool(self.sudo().search(
+                    [('login', '=', login)], limit=1))
+            except Exception:
+                user_exists = False  # be permissive — log the row anyway
+            if not user_exists:
+                self._fc_record_login_event(
+                    result='failure',
+                    failure_reason='unknown_user',
+                    user_id=False,
+                    attempted_login=login or 'unknown',
+                    _credential=credential,
+                )
+            raise
+
+    # ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    # Per-user surface — fields + action method backing the smart button
+    # and "Login Activity" tab on the user form view.
+    # ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    x_fc_login_audit_ids = fields.One2many(
+        'fusion.login.audit', 'user_id',
+        string='Login Activity',
+    )
+    x_fc_login_audit_count = fields.Integer(
+        string='Login Audit Count',
+        compute='_compute_x_fc_login_audit_count',
+    )
+    x_fc_last_successful_login = fields.Datetime(
+        string='Last Successful Login',
+        compute='_compute_x_fc_last_successful_login',
+        store=True,
+    )
+    x_fc_last_login_ip = fields.Char(
+        string='Last Login IP', size=45,
+        compute='_compute_x_fc_last_successful_login',
+        store=True,
+    )
+
+    @api.depends('x_fc_login_audit_ids')
+    def _compute_x_fc_login_audit_count(self):
+        # Odoo 19: read_group → _read_group, returns list of tuples
+        # (group_key, aggregate_value) when given groupby + aggregates.
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        rows = Audit._read_group(
+            domain=[('user_id', 'in', self.ids)],
+            groupby=['user_id'],
+            aggregates=['__count'],
+        )
+        counts = {user.id: count for user, count in rows}
+        for user in self:
+            user.x_fc_login_audit_count = counts.get(user.id, 0)
+
+    @api.depends('x_fc_login_audit_ids.event_time',
+                 'x_fc_login_audit_ids.result',
+                 'x_fc_login_audit_ids.ip_address')
+    def _compute_x_fc_last_successful_login(self):
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        for user in self:
+            row = Audit.search(
+                [('user_id', '=', user.id), ('result', '=', 'success')],
+                order='event_time desc', limit=1,
+            )
+            user.x_fc_last_successful_login = row.event_time or False
+            user.x_fc_last_login_ip = row.ip_address or False
+
+    def action_fc_view_login_audit(self):
+        self.ensure_one()
+        return {
+            'name': _('Login Activity'),
+            'type': 'ir.actions.act_window',
+            'res_model': 'fusion.login.audit',
+            'view_mode': 'list,form',
+            'domain': [('user_id', '=', self.id)],
+            'context': {'create': False, 'edit': False, 'delete': False,
+                        'default_user_id': self.id},
+        }

fusion_login_audit/security/ir.model.access.csv

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+id,name,model_id:id,group_id:id,perm_read,perm_write,perm_create,perm_unlink
+access_fusion_login_audit_system,fusion.login.audit system,model_fusion_login_audit,base.group_system,1,0,0,0

fusion_login_audit/security/security.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+    <data noupdate="1">
+
+        <record id="rule_fusion_login_audit_admin_read" model="ir.rule">
+            <field name="name">fusion.login.audit: admin read only</field>
+            <field name="model_id" ref="model_fusion_login_audit"/>
+            <field name="domain_force">[(1, '=', 1)]</field>
+            <field name="groups" eval="[(4, ref('base.group_system'))]"/>
+            <field name="perm_read" eval="True"/>
+            <field name="perm_write" eval="False"/>
+            <field name="perm_create" eval="False"/>
+            <field name="perm_unlink" eval="False"/>
+        </record>
+
+    </data>
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/tests/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from . import test_login_audit
+from . import test_security

fusion_login_audit/tests/test_login_audit.py

@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from odoo import fields
+from odoo.tests.common import TransactionCase, tagged
+
+
+@tagged('post_install', '-at_install')
+class TestFusionLoginAuditModel(TransactionCase):
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        # `_fc_record_login_event` uses `registry.cursor()` so that the audit
+        # row survives the outer rollback that follows AccessDenied (see
+        # res_users.py for the rationale). Inside a TransactionCase that
+        # rolls back per test, a fresh cursor on a new connection cannot
+        # see uncommitted records (the freshly-created test user FKs into
+        # the audit row), so we put the registry in test mode — that swaps
+        # `registry.cursor()` for a TestCursor that wraps the test cursor.
+        super().setUp()
+        self.registry_enter_test_mode()
+        # The alert tests below assume at least one admin has an email
+        # (otherwise the recipient filter empties and no mail is queued).
+        # In a fresh fusion-dev DB, base.user_admin's email is NULL; the
+        # superuser (__system__) has an email but is filtered out of normal
+        # res.users searches. Ensure admin has a usable email.
+        admin = self.env.ref('base.user_admin')
+        if not admin.email:
+            admin.sudo().write({'email': 'admin@test.example.com'})
+
+    def test_model_exists_and_creates(self):
+        """Audit row can be created with all expected fields."""
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        rec = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'demo@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'ip_address': '203.0.113.5',
+            'user_agent_raw': 'Mozilla/5.0 Test',
+            'browser': 'Test 1.0',
+            'os': 'TestOS',
+            'device_type': 'desktop',
+            'database': self.env.cr.dbname,
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'pending',
+        })
+        self.assertTrue(rec.id)
+        self.assertEqual(rec.result, 'success')
+        self.assertEqual(rec.geo_lookup_state, 'pending')
+        self.assertEqual(rec.database, self.env.cr.dbname)
+        self.assertTrue(rec.event_time)  # default fires
+
+    def test_failure_reason_optional(self):
+        """failure_reason is null on success rows."""
+        rec = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().create({
+            'attempted_login': 'demo@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+        })
+        self.assertFalse(rec.failure_reason)
+
+    def test_geo_state_internal_value(self):
+        """`internal` is an accepted geo_lookup_state value (distinct from private_ip)."""
+        rec = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().create({
+            'attempted_login': 'demo@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'internal',
+        })
+        self.assertEqual(rec.geo_lookup_state, 'internal')
+
+    def test_build_event_vals_with_no_request(self):
+        """Without a live request, geo_lookup_state is 'internal'."""
+        ResUsers = self.env['res.users']
+        vals = ResUsers._fc_build_event_vals(
+            result='success',
+            attempted_login='cron@example.com',
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(vals['result'], 'success')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['attempted_login'], 'cron@example.com')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['ip_address'], 'internal')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['user_agent_raw'], '<no-request>')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['geo_lookup_state'], 'internal')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['database'], self.env.cr.dbname)
+
+    def test_build_event_vals_parses_user_agent(self):
+        """Parser fills browser/os/device_type from a stub UA dict."""
+        ResUsers = self.env['res.users']
+        vals = ResUsers._fc_build_event_vals(
+            result='success',
+            attempted_login='ua@example.com',
+            _override_ip='203.0.113.5',
+            _override_ua='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) '
+                         'AppleWebKit/537.36 Chrome/140.0 Safari/537.36',
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(vals['ip_address'], '203.0.113.5')
+        self.assertIn('Chrome', vals['browser'])
+        self.assertIn('Windows', vals['os'])
+        self.assertEqual(vals['device_type'], 'desktop')
+        self.assertEqual(vals['geo_lookup_state'], 'pending')
+
+    def test_build_event_vals_strips_password(self):
+        """If a credential dict sneaks in, no password leaks into vals."""
+        ResUsers = self.env['res.users']
+        vals = ResUsers._fc_build_event_vals(
+            result='failure',
+            attempted_login='leak@example.com',
+            failure_reason='bad_password',
+            _credential={'login': 'leak@example.com',
+                         'password': 'super-secret-pw',
+                         'type': 'password'},
+        )
+        serialized = repr(vals)
+        self.assertNotIn('super-secret-pw', serialized)
+        self.assertEqual(vals['failure_reason'], 'bad_password')
+
+    def test_update_last_login_writes_audit_row(self):
+        """Calling _update_last_login on a user creates a success row."""
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Audit Tester',
+            'login': 'audit-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'audit-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        before = Audit.search_count([('user_id', '=', user.id)])
+        user._update_last_login()
+        after = Audit.search_count([('user_id', '=', user.id)])
+        self.assertEqual(after, before + 1)
+        row = Audit.search([('user_id', '=', user.id)],
+                           order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertEqual(row.result, 'success')
+        self.assertEqual(row.attempted_login, user.login)
+        self.assertFalse(row.failure_reason)
+        self.assertEqual(row.database, self.env.cr.dbname)
+
+    def test_audit_write_failure_does_not_block_login(self):
+        """An exception inside the audit write must not propagate."""
+        from unittest.mock import patch
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Resilient Tester',
+            'login': 'resilient-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'resilient-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+
+        def boom(self_, vals):
+            raise RuntimeError('simulated audit DB failure')
+
+        with patch.object(type(self.env['fusion.login.audit']),
+                          'create', boom):
+            # Must not raise.
+            user._update_last_login()
+
+    def test_bad_password_writes_failure_row(self):
+        """A wrong password creates a result=failure row with failure_reason='bad_password'."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Wrongpw Tester',
+            'login': 'wrongpw-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'wrongpw-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        before = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login),
+                                     ('result', '=', 'failure')])
+        # NB: cannot use `self.assertRaises(AccessDenied)` — it opens an extra
+        # savepoint (see odoo/tests/common.py::_assertRaises) that rolls back
+        # the audit row written from inside the override.
+        raised = False
+        try:
+            user._check_credentials(
+                {'login': user.login, 'password': 'definitely-wrong',
+                 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            raised = True
+        self.assertTrue(raised, "AccessDenied not raised on wrong password")
+        after = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login),
+                                    ('result', '=', 'failure')])
+        self.assertEqual(after, before + 1)
+        row = Audit.search([('attempted_login', '=', user.login),
+                            ('result', '=', 'failure')],
+                           order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertEqual(row.failure_reason, 'bad_password')
+        self.assertEqual(row.user_id, user)
+
+    def test_bad_password_never_appears_in_row(self):
+        """The attempted password string never lands in any field."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        secret = 'NeverInTheRow-9f3a82'
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Leak Test',
+            'login': 'leak-test-2@example.com',
+            'password': 'leak-test-pw-1',
+        })
+        # NB: manual try/except instead of assertRaises — see note above.
+        raised = False
+        try:
+            user._check_credentials(
+                {'login': user.login, 'password': secret, 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            raised = True
+        self.assertTrue(raised, "AccessDenied not raised on wrong password")
+        row = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().search(
+            [('attempted_login', '=', user.login),
+             ('result', '=', 'failure')],
+            order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertTrue(row, "Audit row not created for bad-password attempt")
+        for fname in ('attempted_login', 'failure_reason', 'user_agent_raw',
+                      'browser', 'os', 'ip_address', 'ip_hostname',
+                      'city', 'country_name', 'country_code', 'geo_state',
+                      'database'):
+            self.assertNotIn(secret, (row[fname] or ''),
+                             f"Password leaked into field {fname}")
+
+    def test_unknown_user_writes_failure_row(self):
+        """A login attempt for a username that does not exist gets logged
+        with user_id=NULL and failure_reason='unknown_user'."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        bogus = 'this-user-does-not-exist@example.com'
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        before = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', bogus)])
+        # NB: manual try/except instead of assertRaises — see comment in
+        # test_bad_password_writes_failure_row. _login is an instance method
+        # in Odoo 19 (not a classmethod as in earlier versions); we call it
+        # on the empty recordset of res.users, which matches what
+        # authenticate() does internally.
+        raised = False
+        try:
+            self.env['res.users']._login(
+                {'login': bogus, 'password': 'whatever',
+                 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            raised = True
+        self.assertTrue(raised, "AccessDenied must propagate after the audit write")
+        after = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', bogus)])
+        self.assertEqual(after, before + 1)
+        row = Audit.search([('attempted_login', '=', bogus)],
+                           order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertFalse(row.user_id)
+        self.assertEqual(row.failure_reason, 'unknown_user')
+        self.assertEqual(row.result, 'failure')
+
+    def test_login_known_user_bad_password_single_row(self):
+        """When _login is the entry point for an existing user with the
+        wrong password, only ONE failure row is written (bad_password from
+        _check_credentials) — NOT two (bad_password + unknown_user). The
+        unknown_user branch must only fire when the login string does not
+        resolve to any user.
+
+        Regression test for the duplicate-row bug discovered during the
+        production deploy smoke on westin-v19: a single failed login for
+        an existing user was creating two audit rows.
+        """
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'NoDupTester',
+            'login': 'nodup-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'nodup-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        before = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)])
+        raised = False
+        try:
+            self.env['res.users']._login(
+                {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong-not-the-real-one',
+                 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            raised = True
+        self.assertTrue(raised)
+        after = Audit.search_count([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)])
+        self.assertEqual(after - before, 1,
+                         "Exactly one row per failed login attempt — not two")
+        row = Audit.search([('attempted_login', '=', user.login)],
+                           order='event_time desc', limit=1)
+        self.assertEqual(row.failure_reason, 'bad_password',
+                         "Existing-user failure must record bad_password, "
+                         "not unknown_user (the user IS in the system)")
+
+    def test_computed_last_successful_login(self):
+        """x_fc_last_successful_login reflects the latest success row."""
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Compute Tester',
+            'login': 'compute-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'compute-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        # Use registry cursor so the audit row survives the transactional
+        # boundary the way the auth-time path does.
+        with self.env.registry.cursor() as audit_cr:
+            from odoo import api
+            audit_env = api.Environment(audit_cr, self.env.uid, self.env.context)
+            audit_env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().create({
+                'user_id': user.id,
+                'attempted_login': user.login,
+                'result': 'success',
+                'database': self.env.cr.dbname,
+                'ip_address': '198.51.100.42',
+            })
+        user.invalidate_recordset(['x_fc_last_successful_login',
+                                    'x_fc_login_audit_count',
+                                    'x_fc_last_login_ip'])
+        self.assertTrue(user.x_fc_last_successful_login)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(user.x_fc_login_audit_count, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(user.x_fc_last_login_ip, '198.51.100.42')
+
+    def test_action_view_login_audit_returns_window_action(self):
+        """The smart-button action returns an act_window scoped to this user."""
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Action Tester',
+            'login': 'action-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'action-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        action = user.action_fc_view_login_audit()
+        self.assertEqual(action['res_model'], 'fusion.login.audit')
+        self.assertEqual(action['type'], 'ir.actions.act_window')
+        # Domain must filter to this user
+        self.assertIn(('user_id', '=', user.id), action['domain'])
+
+    def test_settings_round_trip(self):
+        """Writing settings persists them via ir.config_parameter."""
+        Settings = self.env['res.config.settings'].sudo()
+        Settings.create({
+            'x_fc_login_audit_retention_days': 90,
+            'x_fc_login_audit_alert_threshold': 3,
+            'x_fc_login_audit_alert_window_min': 5,
+            'x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled': False,
+        }).execute()
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        self.assertEqual(ICP.get_param('fusion_login_audit.retention_days'), '90')
+        self.assertEqual(ICP.get_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold'), '3')
+        self.assertEqual(ICP.get_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min'), '5')
+        # Odoo's set_param deletes the row when the value is falsy, so a
+        # Boolean field set to False yields get_param() == False (Python
+        # bool, the default), not the string 'False'.
+        self.assertFalse(ICP.get_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled'))
+
+    def test_failure_burst_queues_one_email(self):
+        """N consecutive failures (within window) queue exactly one mail.mail."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold', '3')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min', '15')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled', 'True')
+        # Clear any cooldown leftover from earlier tests.
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.last_alert:burst@example.com', '')
+
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Burst Tester',
+            'login': 'burst@example.com',
+            'password': 'burst-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Mail = self.env['mail.mail'].sudo()
+        before = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'burst@example.com')])
+        for _i in range(3):
+            raised = False
+            try:
+                user._check_credentials(
+                    {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong',
+                     'type': 'password'},
+                    {'interactive': False},
+                )
+            except AccessDenied:
+                raised = True
+            self.assertTrue(raised)
+        after = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'burst@example.com')])
+        self.assertEqual(after, before + 1,
+                         "Exactly one alert mail should be queued")
+
+    def test_cooldown_suppresses_second_alert(self):
+        """Failures beyond the threshold within the cooldown queue zero more emails."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold', '3')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min', '15')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled', 'True')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.last_alert:cool@example.com', '')
+
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Cooldown Tester',
+            'login': 'cool@example.com',
+            'password': 'cooldown-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Mail = self.env['mail.mail'].sudo()
+        for _i in range(3):
+            try:
+                user._check_credentials(
+                    {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong',
+                     'type': 'password'},
+                    {'interactive': False},
+                )
+            except AccessDenied:
+                pass
+        count_after_3 = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'cool@example.com')])
+        for _i in range(2):
+            try:
+                user._check_credentials(
+                    {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong',
+                     'type': 'password'},
+                    {'interactive': False},
+                )
+            except AccessDenied:
+                pass
+        count_after_5 = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'cool@example.com')])
+        self.assertEqual(count_after_5, count_after_3,
+                         "Cooldown should suppress additional emails")
+
+    def test_alert_disabled_master_switch(self):
+        """alert_enabled=False suppresses all alerts regardless of threshold."""
+        from odoo.exceptions import AccessDenied
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_threshold', '1')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_window_min', '15')
+        # Use the actual boolean field's storage semantics — see CLAUDE.md rule #5.
+        # Writing False through the settings form deletes the param; here we
+        # set the string 'False' explicitly to simulate "disabled".
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.alert_enabled', 'False')
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.last_alert:disabled@example.com', '')
+
+        user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Disabled Tester',
+            'login': 'disabled@example.com',
+            'password': 'disabled-tester-pw-1',
+        })
+        Mail = self.env['mail.mail'].sudo()
+        before = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'disabled@example.com')])
+        try:
+            user._check_credentials(
+                {'login': user.login, 'password': 'wrong',
+                 'type': 'password'},
+                {'interactive': False},
+            )
+        except AccessDenied:
+            pass
+        after = Mail.search_count([('subject', 'ilike', 'disabled@example.com')])
+        self.assertEqual(after, before, "Disabled alerts should queue nothing")
+
+    def test_retention_gc_deletes_old_rows(self):
+        """The GC method deletes rows older than retention_days."""
+        from datetime import timedelta
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.retention_days', '30')
+
+        now = fields.Datetime.now()
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        old = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'gc-old@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'event_time': now - timedelta(days=45),
+        })
+        recent = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'gc-recent@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'event_time': now - timedelta(days=5),
+        })
+        old_id, recent_id = old.id, recent.id
+
+        Audit._fc_retention_gc()
+
+        self.assertFalse(Audit.browse(old_id).exists(),
+                         "Row older than retention_days should be gone")
+        self.assertTrue(Audit.browse(recent_id).exists(),
+                        "Row inside retention_days should survive")
+
+    def test_retention_zero_keeps_forever(self):
+        """retention_days=0 keeps all rows."""
+        from datetime import timedelta
+        ICP = self.env['ir.config_parameter'].sudo()
+        ICP.set_param('fusion_login_audit.retention_days', '0')
+
+        now = fields.Datetime.now()
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        ancient = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'forever@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'event_time': now - timedelta(days=3650),
+        })
+        ancient_id = ancient.id
+
+        Audit._fc_retention_gc()
+
+        self.assertTrue(Audit.browse(ancient_id).exists(),
+                        "retention_days=0 must keep everything")
+
+    def test_geo_private_ip_shortcut(self):
+        """Private IPs short-circuit to state='private_ip' without HTTP."""
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        rec = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'lan@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'ip_address': '192.168.1.40',
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'pending',
+        })
+        Audit._fc_geo_enrich_pending(limit=10)
+        rec.invalidate_recordset()
+        self.assertEqual(rec.geo_lookup_state, 'private_ip')
+        self.assertEqual(rec.country_code, '--')
+
+    def test_geo_cache_hit_avoids_http(self):
+        """A second row with the same recent IP copies from cache."""
+        from unittest.mock import patch
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        # Seed a "done" row from the same IP.
+        Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'seed@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'ip_address': '203.0.113.99',
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'done',
+            'country_code': 'CA',
+            'country_name': 'Canada',
+            'city': 'Toronto',
+            'geo_state': 'Ontario',
+        })
+        target = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'hit@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'ip_address': '203.0.113.99',
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'pending',
+        })
+
+        with patch(
+            'odoo.addons.fusion_login_audit.models.fusion_login_audit.requests.get'
+        ) as mock_get:
+            Audit._fc_geo_enrich_pending(limit=10)
+            mock_get.assert_not_called()
+
+        target.invalidate_recordset()
+        self.assertEqual(target.geo_lookup_state, 'done')
+        self.assertEqual(target.country_code, 'CA')
+        self.assertEqual(target.city, 'Toronto')
+
+    def test_geo_internal_skipped(self):
+        """Rows with geo_lookup_state='internal' are not picked up."""
+        Audit = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo()
+        rec = Audit.create({
+            'attempted_login': 'cron@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'ip_address': 'internal',
+            'geo_lookup_state': 'internal',
+        })
+        # Should be a no-op for 'internal' state (cron only picks 'pending').
+        Audit._fc_geo_enrich_pending(limit=10)
+        rec.invalidate_recordset()
+        self.assertEqual(rec.geo_lookup_state, 'internal')

fusion_login_audit/tests/test_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
+from odoo.exceptions import AccessError
+from odoo.tests.common import TransactionCase, tagged
+
+
+@tagged('post_install', '-at_install')
+class TestFusionLoginAuditSecurity(TransactionCase):
+    """Tests for the layered protection on `fusion.login.audit`:
+
+    Layer 1 — ACL (security/ir.model.access.csv): grants read-only access to
+    `base.group_system` and nothing to any other group. Blocks write/create/
+    unlink for everyone via the ORM regardless of `sudo()`.
+
+    Layer 2 — Record rule (security/security.xml): group-specific rule that
+    grants admins an unrestricted domain (`[(1,'=',1)]`). The rule does NOT
+    actively restrict non-admins — Odoo's semantics for a group-scoped rule
+    is "the rule only applies to users in that group". Non-admins are gated
+    purely by the ACL, which denies them everything. The rule's value is
+    documentation + future-proofing (it keeps admin access explicit if the
+    ACL is ever loosened with a per-group read row; the admin path remains
+    explicit and self-documenting). It is NOT a security gate the ACL relies on.
+
+    Test naming reflects which layer actually does the work:
+    - test_acl_blocks_*  — exercises Layer 1 (ACL alone is sufficient).
+    - test_admin_can_read_through_acl_and_rule — exercises both layers in
+                          the positive path (admin must satisfy ACL grant
+                          AND the admin-scoped rule's domain).
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        super().setUp()
+        self.audit_row = self.env['fusion.login.audit'].sudo().create({
+            'attempted_login': 'sec-test@example.com',
+            'result': 'success',
+            'database': self.env.cr.dbname,
+        })
+        # Internal non-admin user (active employee, not a Settings admin).
+        self.regular_user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Regular Tester',
+            'login': 'regular-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'regular-tester-pw-1',
+            'group_ids': [(6, 0, [self.env.ref('base.group_user').id])],
+        })
+        # Portal user (share=True) — must not see audit data either.
+        self.portal_user = self.env['res.users'].sudo().create({
+            'name': 'Portal Tester',
+            'login': 'portal-tester@example.com',
+            'password': 'portal-tester-pw-1',
+            'group_ids': [(6, 0, [self.env.ref('base.group_portal').id])],
+        })
+
+    def test_admin_can_read_through_acl_and_rule(self):
+        """A Settings admin satisfies both the ACL (grants read) and the
+        record rule (admin-only domain), so the read succeeds."""
+        admin = self.env.ref('base.user_admin')
+        rec = self.audit_row.with_user(admin).read(['attempted_login'])
+        self.assertEqual(rec[0]['attempted_login'], 'sec-test@example.com')
+
+    def test_acl_blocks_read_for_regular_user(self):
+        """A `base.group_user` member has no ACL grant on the model. The
+        ACL alone denies the read; the record rule never gets consulted."""
+        with self.assertRaises(AccessError):
+            self.audit_row.with_user(self.regular_user).read(['attempted_login'])
+
+    def test_acl_blocks_read_for_portal_user(self):
+        """A `base.group_portal` (share=True) user has no ACL grant either.
+        Audit data must never leak to a portal user — IP and attempted_login
+        are sensitive."""
+        with self.assertRaises(AccessError):
+            self.audit_row.with_user(self.portal_user).read(['attempted_login'])
+
+    def test_acl_blocks_write_for_admin(self):
+        """Even Settings admins cannot write — the ACL grants no group any
+        write permission on this model (audit log is append-only). The rule's
+        `perm_write=False` means 'rule does not constrain this op', so this
+        denial is the ACL's work alone."""
+        admin = self.env.ref('base.user_admin')
+        with self.assertRaises(AccessError):
+            self.audit_row.with_user(admin).write({'attempted_login': 'tampered'})
+
+    def test_acl_blocks_unlink_for_admin(self):
+        """Append-only also at the unlink boundary. ACL grants no group
+        delete permission; the record rule's `perm_unlink=False` exempts
+        it from gating this op."""
+        admin = self.env.ref('base.user_admin')
+        with self.assertRaises(AccessError):
+            self.audit_row.with_user(admin).unlink()
+
+    # Note: a "rule actively blocks non-admins" test was attempted but
+    # removed once the actual Odoo semantics were verified. A group-scoped
+    # rule (groups=[base.group_system]) only applies to users in that group.
+    # Granting a base.group_user member an ACL read row would let them read
+    # rows — the rule does not filter them. To make the rule truly restrictive
+    # we would need a global rule (groups=[]) with domain [(0,'=',1)] paired
+    # with the admin grant. That is a security-model redesign and out of
+    # scope for T3. The ACL already provides the actual gate.
+
+    # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    # T14: view-level visibility checks. The smart button and the "Login
+    # Activity" tab on res.users are gated by groups="base.group_system"
+    # on the inner XML nodes (the inherited view record itself cannot
+    # carry groups — CLAUDE.md rule #11). Verify the gate works by asking
+    # for the form view as a non-admin and confirming the x_fc_* fields
+    # are stripped from the arch.
+    # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    def test_view_hides_button_and_tab_for_non_admin(self):
+        """A regular user's get_view() does not contain the x_fc_login_audit_*
+        fields — they live behind groups="base.group_system" XML attributes."""
+        view = self.env['res.users'].with_user(self.regular_user).get_view(
+            view_id=self.env.ref('base.view_users_form').id,
+            view_type='form',
+        )
+        arch = view['arch']
+        self.assertNotIn('x_fc_login_audit_count', arch,
+                         "Smart-button field must not leak into non-admin view")
+        self.assertNotIn('x_fc_login_audit_ids', arch,
+                         "Login Activity tab must not leak into non-admin view")
+
+    def test_view_shows_button_and_tab_for_admin(self):
+        """A Settings admin DOES see both nodes."""
+        admin = self.env.ref('base.user_admin')
+        view = self.env['res.users'].with_user(admin).get_view(
+            view_id=self.env.ref('base.view_users_form').id,
+            view_type='form',
+        )
+        arch = view['arch']
+        self.assertIn('x_fc_login_audit_count', arch)
+        self.assertIn('x_fc_login_audit_ids', arch)

fusion_login_audit/views/fusion_login_audit_views.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+
+    <!-- List -->
+    <record id="view_fusion_login_audit_list" model="ir.ui.view">
+        <field name="name">fusion.login.audit.list</field>
+        <field name="model">fusion.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="arch" type="xml">
+            <list create="false" edit="false" delete="false"
+                  default_order="event_time desc"
+                  decoration-success="result=='success'"
+                  decoration-danger="result=='failure'">
+                <field name="event_time"/>
+                <field name="user_id"/>
+                <field name="attempted_login"/>
+                <field name="result" widget="badge"/>
+                <field name="failure_reason"/>
+                <field name="ip_address"/>
+                <field name="country_code"/>
+                <field name="city"/>
+                <field name="browser"/>
+                <field name="device_type"/>
+                <field name="database" optional="hide"/>
+            </list>
+        </field>
+    </record>
+
+    <!-- Form (readonly) -->
+    <record id="view_fusion_login_audit_form" model="ir.ui.view">
+        <field name="name">fusion.login.audit.form</field>
+        <field name="model">fusion.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="arch" type="xml">
+            <form create="false" edit="false" delete="false">
+                <sheet>
+                    <group>
+                        <group string="Event">
+                            <field name="event_time" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="result" readonly="1" widget="badge"/>
+                            <field name="failure_reason" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="user_id" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="attempted_login" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="database" readonly="1"/>
+                        </group>
+                        <group string="Source">
+                            <field name="ip_address" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="ip_hostname" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="country_code" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="country_name" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="geo_state" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="city" readonly="1"/>
+                            <field name="geo_lookup_state" readonly="1"/>
+                        </group>
+                    </group>
+                    <group string="Client">
+                        <field name="device_type" readonly="1"/>
+                        <field name="browser" readonly="1"/>
+                        <field name="os" readonly="1"/>
+                        <field name="user_agent_raw" readonly="1"/>
+                    </group>
+                </sheet>
+            </form>
+        </field>
+    </record>
+
+    <!-- Search -->
+    <record id="view_fusion_login_audit_search" model="ir.ui.view">
+        <field name="name">fusion.login.audit.search</field>
+        <field name="model">fusion.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="arch" type="xml">
+            <search>
+                <field name="attempted_login"/>
+                <field name="user_id"/>
+                <field name="ip_address"/>
+                <field name="country_code"/>
+                <filter name="filter_success" string="Successes"
+                        domain="[('result','=','success')]"/>
+                <filter name="filter_failure" string="Failures"
+                        domain="[('result','=','failure')]"/>
+                <separator/>
+                <filter name="filter_24h" string="Last 24 hours"
+                        domain="[('event_time','&gt;=', (context_today() - relativedelta(days=1)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d 00:00:00'))]"/>
+                <filter name="filter_7d" string="Last 7 days"
+                        domain="[('event_time','&gt;=', (context_today() - relativedelta(days=7)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d 00:00:00'))]"/>
+                <filter name="filter_30d" string="Last 30 days"
+                        domain="[('event_time','&gt;=', (context_today() - relativedelta(days=30)).strftime('%Y-%m-%d 00:00:00'))]"/>
+                <separator/>
+                <filter name="filter_unknown_user" string="Unknown users"
+                        domain="[('user_id','=',False)]"/>
+                <group>
+                    <filter name="group_user" string="User"
+                            context="{'group_by': 'user_id'}"/>
+                    <filter name="group_country" string="Country"
+                            context="{'group_by': 'country_code'}"/>
+                    <filter name="group_ip" string="IP"
+                            context="{'group_by': 'ip_address'}"/>
+                </group>
+            </search>
+        </field>
+    </record>
+
+    <!-- Window actions -->
+    <record id="action_fusion_login_audit_all" model="ir.actions.act_window">
+        <field name="name">Login Events</field>
+        <field name="res_model">fusion.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="view_mode">list,form</field>
+        <field name="search_view_id" ref="view_fusion_login_audit_search"/>
+        <field name="context">{}</field>
+    </record>
+
+    <record id="action_fusion_login_audit_failures_24h" model="ir.actions.act_window">
+        <field name="name">Failed Logins (24h)</field>
+        <field name="res_model">fusion.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="view_mode">list,form</field>
+        <field name="search_view_id" ref="view_fusion_login_audit_search"/>
+        <field name="context">{'search_default_filter_failure': 1, 'search_default_filter_24h': 1}</field>
+    </record>
+
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/views/menus.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+
+    <menuitem id="menu_fusion_login_audit_root"
+              name="Login Audit"
+              parent="base.menu_administration"
+              groups="base.group_system"
+              sequence="100"/>
+
+    <menuitem id="menu_fusion_login_audit_all"
+              name="Login Events"
+              parent="menu_fusion_login_audit_root"
+              action="action_fusion_login_audit_all"
+              groups="base.group_system"
+              sequence="10"/>
+
+    <menuitem id="menu_fusion_login_audit_failures"
+              name="Failed Logins (24h)"
+              parent="menu_fusion_login_audit_root"
+              action="action_fusion_login_audit_failures_24h"
+              groups="base.group_system"
+              sequence="20"/>
+
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/views/res_config_settings_views.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+
+    <record id="view_res_config_settings_form_login_audit" model="ir.ui.view">
+        <field name="name">res.config.settings.form.login.audit</field>
+        <field name="model">res.config.settings</field>
+        <field name="inherit_id" ref="base_setup.res_config_settings_view_form"/>
+        <field name="arch" type="xml">
+            <xpath expr="//block[@id='user_default_rights']" position="after">
+                <block title="Login Audit"
+                       name="login_audit_block"
+                       groups="base.group_system">
+                    <setting id="login_audit_retention"
+                             string="Retention (days)"
+                             help="0 = keep forever">
+                        <field name="x_fc_login_audit_retention_days"/>
+                    </setting>
+                    <setting id="login_audit_alert_enabled"
+                             string="Send failed-login alerts"
+                             help="Email Settings admins when consecutive failures cross the threshold">
+                        <field name="x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled"/>
+                    </setting>
+                    <setting id="login_audit_alert_threshold"
+                             string="Alert threshold (failures)">
+                        <field name="x_fc_login_audit_alert_threshold"/>
+                    </setting>
+                    <setting id="login_audit_alert_window"
+                             string="Alert window (minutes)">
+                        <field name="x_fc_login_audit_alert_window_min"/>
+                    </setting>
+                </block>
+            </xpath>
+        </field>
+    </record>
+
+</odoo>

fusion_login_audit/views/res_users_views.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<odoo>
+
+    <record id="view_users_form_inherit_login_audit" model="ir.ui.view">
+        <field name="name">res.users.form.inherit.fusion_login_audit</field>
+        <field name="model">res.users</field>
+        <field name="inherit_id" ref="base.view_users_form"/>
+        <!-- Odoo 19: groups MUST be on the inherited XML nodes (button + page
+             below), NOT on the ir.ui.view record itself. Setting `group_ids`
+             on the record raises ParseError "Inherited view cannot have
+             'groups' defined on the record. Use 'groups' attributes inside
+             the view definition". -->
+        <field name="arch" type="xml">
+            <!-- Smart button -->
+            <xpath expr="//div[@name='button_box']" position="inside">
+                <button name="action_fc_view_login_audit"
+                        type="object"
+                        class="oe_stat_button"
+                        icon="fa-key"
+                        groups="base.group_system">
+                    <field name="x_fc_login_audit_count" widget="statinfo"
+                           string="Logins"/>
+                </button>
+            </xpath>
+
+            <!-- Login Activity tab appended at the end of the notebook -->
+            <xpath expr="//notebook" position="inside">
+                <page string="Login Activity"
+                      name="fc_login_activity"
+                      groups="base.group_system">
+                    <group>
+                        <field name="x_fc_last_successful_login" readonly="1"/>
+                        <field name="x_fc_last_login_ip" readonly="1"/>
+                    </group>
+                    <field name="x_fc_login_audit_ids" readonly="1"
+                           context="{'create': False, 'edit': False, 'delete': False}">
+                        <list create="false" edit="false" delete="false"
+                              limit="30" default_order="event_time desc">
+                            <field name="event_time"/>
+                            <field name="result" decoration-success="result=='success'"
+                                                  decoration-danger="result=='failure'"
+                                                  widget="badge"/>
+                            <field name="failure_reason"/>
+                            <field name="ip_address"/>
+                            <field name="country_code"/>
+                            <field name="city"/>
+                            <field name="browser"/>
+                            <field name="os"/>
+                        </list>
+                    </field>
+                </page>
+            </xpath>
+        </field>
+    </record>
+
+</odoo>