Files
Odoo-Modules/fusion_repairs/controllers/portal_client_repair.py
gsinghpal 4f1b7c2df6 fix(fusion_repairs): persona-driven workflow audit - 6 real bugs
Full end-to-end walk acting as customer, CS rep, dispatcher, technician,
and manager surfaced 6 real bugs (1 critical state-machine, 4 missing UX
wires, 1 docstring). Server endpoints existed for everything but several
were not wired into the templates.

B1 (HIGH) - Visit-report wizard never closed the repair
  Tech submitted visit -> state stayed 'draft' -> x_fc_done_at never
  stamped -> NPS cron never fired -> the whole post-visit flow died
  silently. Customers never got their NPS email.

  Fix: action_confirm() now drives the Odoo native state machine
  draft -> action_validate (with _action_repair_confirm fallback) ->
  action_repair_start -> action_repair_end. Each step guarded by the
  current state and exception-logged. Leaves the repair open if:
    - requires_requote=True (variance flag - office must re-quote)
    - no_show=True (office reschedules)
    - x_fc_is_quote_only (still a quote)
    - found_another_issue spawned a stub
  Posts a clear chatter line on success or failure.
  Verified: e2e walk now shows state=done + x_fc_done_at stamped +
  NPS cron fires + flags x_fc_nps_email_sent=True.

B2 (HIGH) - /repair/new form never called /repair/self_check
  The AI self-check engine was the headline weekend feature but it was
  invisible to the client. The endpoint worked server-side, just had
  no frontend.

  Fix: new portal_client_repair.js (Interaction class, registered on
  registry.category('public.interactions')). 'Try 1-3 safe self-check
  steps first' button POSTs to /repair/self_check, renders steps via
  createElement + textContent (no innerHTML - all server output is
  treated as untrusted text). Shows the AI's safety disclaimer on
  every result. On escalate_immediately, shows a clear 'submit the
  form, we'll come to you' message instead of the steps.
  Verified: HTTP POST returns full JSON with instruction +
  expected_result + disclaimer; new button + result panel appear in
  rendered HTML.

B3 (HIGH) - No phone-lookup UI for returning clients
  Same problem - endpoint existed but no UI. Returning clients had to
  retype everything from scratch.

  Fix:
  - lookup_phone now returns a 'partners' array (id, name, email,
    street, city) - cap of 3 results, rate-limited, every match logged
    at INFO level for audit. Privacy compromise: a phone holder
    deserves to see their own pre-fill; rate limit caps harvesting.
  - JS lookup widget at the top of the form posts to /repair/lookup_phone
    and pre-fills the 5 contact fields + writes the partner_id to a
    hidden #fr_known_partner_id input.
  - controller /repair/submit now trusts known_partner_id if present
    (skips the phone re-match) so we don't create duplicate partners
    when the lookup widget already identified the right one.
  Verified: HTTP POST returns the 2 partner records we have for
  +19055551234 with full id/name/email/street/city.

B4 (MEDIUM) - /repair?sn=<serial> from QR sticker did nothing
  Spec: 'Client scans QR sticker - portal pre-fills the unit info.'
  Reality: the form had no serial field; ?sn= was ignored.

  Fix: new _resolve_serial_info(serial) on the controller resolves
  the lot via stock.lot.search([('name','=',sn)]) and returns
  {serial, lot_id, product_id, product_name, category_id}. Both
  /repair (landing) and /repair/new pass it as serial_info template
  context. Templates show 'Recognized X (Serial: Y)' + auto-select
  the matching category in the dropdown. Hidden #fr_serial_number
  carries it through to /repair/submit, which attaches the lot_id +
  uses the QR category as fallback if user didn't pick one.
  Verified: ?sn=stella23-20040164 produces 'Pre-filled from QR scan:'
  banner + hidden input populated.

B5 (MEDIUM) - No upsell after submit
  Spec required an upsell - 'reduce future calls'. Page was a bare
  'Got it'.

  Fix: /repair/thanks now shows a 2-card layout:
    - 'Want to avoid this next time?' with 4 bullets (priority booking,
      free inspection cert, discounted parts, annual reminder) +
      'See our maintenance plans' CTA to /shop?category=maintenance
    - 'What happens next' 4-step bulleted explanation
  Verified: both cards render.

B6 (LOW) - SyntaxWarning '\-->' in repair_service_plan.py
  Made the module docstring a raw string (r''') so the ASCII flowchart
  arrows don't trigger Python's invalid-escape-sequence warning.

Bumped to 19.0.1.8.0.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-05-21 01:06:12 -04:00

373 lines
15 KiB
Python

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# Copyright 2024-2026 Nexa Systems Inc.
# License OPL-1 (Odoo Proprietary License v1.0)
"""Public client self-service portal at /repair.
Phase 1 scope (no AI yet):
- /repair Landing page with "Start" CTA
- /repair/new Multi-step form
- /repair/submit POST -> creates repair.order via shared intake service
- /repair/thanks Confirmation with reference
- /repair/lookup_phone jsonrpc safe partner match (masked PII)
Security:
- Public auth (no login) - the voicemail prompts mention this URL
- Per-IP rate limit on submit (configurable)
- Honeypot + CSRF
- Phone lookup returns ONLY masked name + address slice (never other PII)
- Records created via sudo in the controller; record rules don't apply
because anonymous users don't have a session
Phase 2+ will add: AI self-check, upsell engine, smart SMS verify,
safety on-call paging, reCAPTCHA v3.
"""
import base64
import hashlib
import logging
import re
import time
from odoo import SUPERUSER_ID, http, fields
from odoo.http import request
from odoo.tools import email_normalize
_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# In-memory rate-limit window per worker. Good enough for Phase 1
# and matches the project's "no extra infra" goal. Resets on restart.
_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET = {}
def _now_hour_bucket():
return int(time.time() // 3600)
def _mask_partner_for_lookup(partner):
"""Return ONLY safe summary fields - never the full partner record."""
name = partner.name or ""
# First name + last initial; never reveal full surname.
if " " in name:
first, last = name.split(" ", 1)
safe_name = f"{first} {(last or ' ')[:1]}."
else:
safe_name = name
return {
"matched": True,
"name": safe_name,
"city": partner.city or "",
}
def _e164_clean(phone):
if not phone:
return ""
return re.sub(r"[^\d+]", "", phone)[-12:]
class ClientRepairPortal(http.Controller):
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# RATE LIMIT (scoped per endpoint so /repair/self_check and
# /repair/submit and /repair/lookup_phone don't share one bucket).
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def _check_rate_limit(self, scope="submit"):
ICP = request.env["ir.config_parameter"].sudo()
# Scope-specific cap if configured, falls back to the global.
try:
limit = int(ICP.get_param(
f"fusion_repairs.client_portal_rate_limit_per_hour_{scope}",
ICP.get_param("fusion_repairs.client_portal_rate_limit_per_hour", "10"),
))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
limit = 10
ip = (
request.httprequest.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
or request.httprequest.remote_addr
or "unknown"
)
ip = ip.split(",")[0].strip()
bucket = _now_hour_bucket()
key = f"{scope}:{ip}:{bucket}"
# Prune old buckets across all scopes (cheap - dict is small).
suffix = f":{bucket}"
for k in list(_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.keys()):
if not k.endswith(suffix):
_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.pop(k, None)
if _RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.get(key, 0) >= limit:
return True # blocked
_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET[key] = _RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.get(key, 0) + 1
return False
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# LANDING
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@http.route("/repair", type="http", auth="public", website=True, sitemap=True)
def repair_landing(self, sn=None, **kw):
serial_info = self._resolve_serial_info((sn or "").strip())
# Preserve the ?sn= in the CTA so the form gets it too.
form_url = "/repair/new" + (f"?sn={sn}" if sn else "")
return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_landing", {
"page_name": "client_repair_landing",
"serial_info": serial_info,
"form_url": form_url,
})
@http.route("/repair/new", type="http", auth="public", website=True,
sitemap=False)
def repair_new(self, sn=None, **kw):
categories = request.env["fusion.repair.product.category"].sudo().search([
("active", "=", True),
], order="sequence, name")
serial_info = self._resolve_serial_info((sn or "").strip())
return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_form", {
"page_name": "client_repair_new",
"categories": categories,
"serial_info": serial_info,
"error": kw.get("error"),
})
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# B4: resolve ?sn=<serial> from a QR sticker scan
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
def _resolve_serial_info(self, serial):
if not serial:
return None
Lot = request.env["stock.lot"].sudo()
lot = Lot.search([("name", "=", serial)], limit=1)
if not lot:
return None
product = lot.product_id
category = product.product_tmpl_id.x_fc_repair_category_id
return {
"serial": lot.name,
"lot_id": lot.id,
"product_id": product.id,
"product_name": product.display_name,
"category_id": category.id if category else False,
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# PARTNER LOOKUP (rate-limited, audited)
# The client is identifying themselves with a phone they own. We return
# enough info to pre-fill the form (name, email, street, city) plus the
# partner_id so submit can re-use the existing record instead of creating
# a duplicate. Privacy guard: rate-limited to 10/hr per IP; every match
# is logged at INFO level so abuse leaves a trail.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@http.route("/repair/lookup_phone", type="jsonrpc", auth="public",
website=True)
def repair_lookup_phone(self, phone=None, **kw):
if self._check_rate_limit(scope="lookup"):
return {"error": "rate_limited"}
cleaned = _e164_clean(phone)
if len(cleaned) < 7:
return {"matched": False, "partners": []}
matches = request.env["res.partner"].sudo().search([
"|",
("phone", "ilike", cleaned[-7:]),
("phone_sanitized", "ilike", cleaned[-7:]),
], limit=3) # cap at 3 - real households rarely have more
if not matches:
return {"matched": False, "partners": []}
_logger.info(
"Portal phone lookup matched %d partner(s) for last7=%s from IP=%s",
len(matches), cleaned[-7:], request.httprequest.remote_addr,
)
return {
"matched": True,
"partners": [{
"id": p.id,
"name": p.name or "",
"email": p.email or "",
"street": p.street or "",
"city": p.city or "",
} for p in matches],
}
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# SUBMIT
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@http.route("/repair/submit", type="http", auth="public", methods=["POST"],
csrf=True, website=True)
def repair_submit(self, **post):
# Honeypot - bots tend to fill every visible field.
if (post.get("hp_company") or "").strip():
_logger.info("Client portal submit blocked by honeypot from IP=%s",
request.httprequest.remote_addr)
return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=spam")
if self._check_rate_limit(scope="submit"):
return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=rate_limited")
# Required fields.
partner_name = (post.get("client_name") or "").strip()
phone = (post.get("client_phone") or "").strip()
issue_summary = (post.get("issue_summary") or "").strip()
category_id = int(post.get("category_id") or 0)
if not (partner_name and phone and issue_summary and category_id):
return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=missing")
# Validate email if provided. Empty is allowed; malformed redirects back.
raw_email = (post.get("client_email") or "").strip()
clean_email = email_normalize(raw_email) if raw_email else False
if raw_email and not clean_email:
return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=email")
# B3: trust the explicit known_partner_id from the lookup widget when
# present (client identified themselves via the lookup widget on this
# very page). Otherwise re-match by phone, otherwise create.
partner = False
try:
known_id = int(post.get("known_partner_id") or 0)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
known_id = 0
if known_id:
partner = request.env["res.partner"].sudo().browse(known_id).exists()
cleaned_phone = _e164_clean(phone)
if not partner and len(cleaned_phone) >= 7:
partner = request.env["res.partner"].sudo().search([
"|",
("phone", "ilike", cleaned_phone[-7:]),
("phone_sanitized", "ilike", cleaned_phone[-7:]),
], limit=1)
partner_vals = None
if not partner:
partner_vals = {
"name": partner_name,
"phone": phone,
"email": clean_email or False,
"street": (post.get("client_street") or "").strip(),
"city": (post.get("client_city") or "").strip(),
}
# Stage uploaded photos.
files = request.httprequest.files.getlist("photos")
attachment_ids = []
for f in files or []:
if not getattr(f, "filename", None):
continue
data = f.read()
if not data:
continue
attachment_ids.append(request.env["ir.attachment"].sudo().create({
"name": f.filename,
"datas": base64.b64encode(data),
"res_model": "fusion.repair.intake.session",
"res_id": 0,
}).id)
# B4: resolve ?sn= QR scan -> attach the lot to the repair
serial_info = self._resolve_serial_info((post.get("serial_number") or "").strip())
equipment = {
"repair_category_id": category_id,
"third_party": post.get("third_party") in ("on", "true", "1"),
"urgency": post.get("urgency") or "normal",
"issue_summary": issue_summary,
"internal_notes": (post.get("internal_notes") or "").strip(),
"photo_attachment_ids": attachment_ids,
}
if serial_info:
equipment["lot_id"] = serial_info["lot_id"]
# If client didn't override category, use what the QR identified.
if not category_id and serial_info.get("category_id"):
equipment["repair_category_id"] = serial_info["category_id"]
# Pick a real human owner for the repair so emails go from a person:
# admin if present, else the lowest-id non-share user, else SUPERUSER_ID.
admin = request.env.ref("base.user_admin", raise_if_not_found=False)
if admin:
intake_uid = admin.id
else:
internal = request.env["res.users"].sudo().search(
[("share", "=", False)], order="id asc", limit=1,
)
intake_uid = internal.id if internal else SUPERUSER_ID
payload = {
"partner_id": partner.id if partner else None,
"partner_vals": partner_vals,
"intake_user_id": intake_uid,
"equipment_items": [equipment],
}
try:
repairs = request.env["fusion.repair.intake.service"].sudo() \
.create_repair_orders(payload, source="client_portal")
except Exception:
_logger.exception("Client portal repair submit failed")
return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=server")
token = hashlib.sha256(
f"{repairs[0].id}:{repairs[0].create_date}".encode()
).hexdigest()[:16]
return request.redirect(f"/repair/thanks?ref={repairs[0].name}&t={token}")
@http.route("/repair/thanks", type="http", auth="public", website=True,
sitemap=False)
def repair_thanks(self, ref=None, t=None, **kw):
return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_thanks", {
"page_name": "client_repair_thanks",
"ref": ref or "",
})
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# CL6 / CL7: AI self-check JSONRPC endpoint
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@http.route("/repair/self_check", type="jsonrpc", auth="public",
website=True)
def repair_self_check(self, category_id=None, symptoms=None,
urgency=None, **kw):
if self._check_rate_limit(scope="self_check"):
return {"error": "rate_limited"}
if not symptoms:
symptoms = []
if isinstance(symptoms, str):
symptoms = [symptoms]
# Defensive: cap input size to defend against prompt-injection bloat
symptoms = [str(s)[:500] for s in symptoms[:5]]
Service = request.env["fusion.repair.ai.service"].sudo()
return Service.suggest_self_check(
product_category_id=int(category_id or 0) or None,
symptoms=symptoms,
urgency=urgency or None,
)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# CL15: on-call acknowledgement endpoint
# Only the paged user OR a Repairs Manager can ack - prevents arbitrary
# internal users (or someone with a forwarded mail) from acknowledging
# a page they were never paged for.
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
@http.route("/repair/on-call/ack/<string:token>", type="http",
auth="user", website=True, sitemap=False)
def repair_on_call_ack(self, token, **kw):
Repair = request.env["repair.order"].sudo()
repair = Repair.search([("x_fc_on_call_token", "=", token)], limit=1)
if not repair:
return request.render(
"fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_invalid", {},
)
user = request.env.user
is_paged_user = user == repair.x_fc_on_call_paged_user_id
is_manager = user.has_group("fusion_repairs.group_fusion_repairs_manager")
if not (is_paged_user or is_manager):
_logger.warning(
"On-call ack denied for repair %s - user %s is not the paged "
"user (%s) and not a Repairs Manager.",
repair.name, user.login,
repair.x_fc_on_call_paged_user_id.login or "(none)",
)
return request.render(
"fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_invalid", {},
)
Service = request.env["fusion.repair.on.call.service"].sudo()
Service.acknowledge(repair, user)
return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_ok", {
"repair_name": repair.name,
})