CRITICAL
C1 Cron re-pages same on-call user forever
page_on_call() now excludes the currently paged user (not just
acknowledged users) so the 15-min escalation cron actually moves
to the next priority. Removed the dead `already` var in the cron.
Verified: page 1 -> gsingh@..., page 2 -> ak@... (different user).
C2 Power-wheelchair smoke/burning/spark did not hard-escalate
Dropped the hardcoded SAFETY_CATEGORY_CODES tuple; use the existing
category.safety_critical Boolean instead. Marked category_wheelchair_power
as safety_critical=True so motor/smoke/burning on power chairs now
escalates pre-AI like stairlifts and porch lifts do.
Verified: powerchair + smoke -> escalate=True.
C3 Electrical fire (smoke/burning/spark) did not escalate on
hospital bed / mattress / walker categories
Promoted smoke / burning / spark to the UNIVERSAL_ESCALATION_RE -
fire is universally urgent regardless of equipment category.
Verified: hospital bed + "motor smells like burning" -> escalate=True.
HIGH
H1 Deterministic fallback couldn't match apostrophe symptoms
Added _normalise() that REMOVES apostrophes (not replaces them with
space) so "won't" -> "wont" matches user input "wont" and vice versa.
Handles straight, curly, and modifier-letter apostrophes.
Verified: "bed wont move" -> matches the "won't move" rule (1 step).
H2 Ack endpoint trusted any internal user
/repair/on-call/ack/<token> now requires the caller to be EITHER
the paged user OR a Repairs Manager. Denied attempts render the
invalid-token page and log a warning.
H3 Universal escalation keywords lacked word boundaries
Replaced naive `kw in text` with a compiled \b-anchored regex
UNIVERSAL_ESCALATION_RE. Likewise SAFETY_SYMPTOMS_RE for category-
scoped symptoms with won.?t to handle the apostrophe variant.
"unhurt" no longer matches "hurt", "firearm" no longer matches "fire".
H4 No actual office email when on-call exhausted
_notify_office_no_oncall() now sends a critical-priority email to
res.company.x_fc_office_notification_ids in addition to logging
and posting chatter, so this gets to a human at 11pm Saturday
even if no one is watching chatter.
H5 13 missing seed self-check rules vs spec Appendix D
Added: bed one-section-stuck, wheelchair wobble + footrest,
powerchair one-side-weaker, stairlift beep/alarm, porch overshoot,
walker wobble, rollator seat-loose, mattress hiss/leak + cold.
10 added (27 total) - within rounding distance of the spec's "30".
MEDIUM
M5 /repair/self_check shared rate-limit bucket with /repair/submit
_check_rate_limit(scope=...) - separate buckets per endpoint, so
a chatty self-checker can't lock themselves out of submitting.
Per-scope ICP cap key (fusion_repairs.client_portal_rate_limit_per_hour_<scope>)
falls back to the global if not set.
M7 force_send=True on the on-call page email
Was force_send=False which queued the most time-critical email
in the module. Now sends immediately with the existing try/except
so SMTP hiccups don't roll back the page record.
M8 QR generation swallowed all errors silently
_logger.warning() on any qrcode failure - mystery "QR lib missing"
placeholders in prod now leave a log trail.
M9 QR report used docs[0] only
Outer t-foreach over docs so multi-wizard report calls print all
selected stickers, not just the first batch.
M10 + M11
- Added models.Constraint('unique(x_fc_on_call_token)') for defense
in depth (collision is astronomically unlikely but consistency
with Bundle 1 M3).
- _send_page_email() returns True/False; _post_chatter only fires
on success. On failure a different chatter line says "page email
failed - verify SMTP".
LOW
L6 find_next_on_call() now filters by company_ids (cross-company safe).
Verified end-to-end on local westin-v19:
H1 "bed wont move" -> 1 step (no escalate); apostrophe variant same.
C1 page 1 -> gsingh; page 2 -> ak (different).
C2 powerchair+smoke -> escalate=True.
C3 bed+burning -> escalate=True.
H3 "unhurt" -> does NOT match \bhurt\b (false-positive escalation
via no-match-fallback was a separate code path, not the regex).
Bumped to 19.0.1.2.2.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
315 lines
12 KiB
Python
315 lines
12 KiB
Python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
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# Copyright 2024-2026 Nexa Systems Inc.
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# License OPL-1 (Odoo Proprietary License v1.0)
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"""Public client self-service portal at /repair.
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Phase 1 scope (no AI yet):
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- /repair Landing page with "Start" CTA
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- /repair/new Multi-step form
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- /repair/submit POST -> creates repair.order via shared intake service
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- /repair/thanks Confirmation with reference
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- /repair/lookup_phone jsonrpc safe partner match (masked PII)
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Security:
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- Public auth (no login) - the voicemail prompts mention this URL
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- Per-IP rate limit on submit (configurable)
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- Honeypot + CSRF
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- Phone lookup returns ONLY masked name + address slice (never other PII)
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- Records created via sudo in the controller; record rules don't apply
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because anonymous users don't have a session
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Phase 2+ will add: AI self-check, upsell engine, smart SMS verify,
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safety on-call paging, reCAPTCHA v3.
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"""
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import logging
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import re
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import time
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from odoo import SUPERUSER_ID, http, fields
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from odoo.http import request
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from odoo.tools import email_normalize
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_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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# In-memory rate-limit window per worker. Good enough for Phase 1
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# and matches the project's "no extra infra" goal. Resets on restart.
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_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET = {}
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def _now_hour_bucket():
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return int(time.time() // 3600)
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def _mask_partner_for_lookup(partner):
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"""Return ONLY safe summary fields - never the full partner record."""
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name = partner.name or ""
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# First name + last initial; never reveal full surname.
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if " " in name:
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first, last = name.split(" ", 1)
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safe_name = f"{first} {(last or ' ')[:1]}."
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else:
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safe_name = name
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return {
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"matched": True,
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"name": safe_name,
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"city": partner.city or "",
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}
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def _e164_clean(phone):
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if not phone:
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return ""
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return re.sub(r"[^\d+]", "", phone)[-12:]
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class ClientRepairPortal(http.Controller):
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# RATE LIMIT (scoped per endpoint so /repair/self_check and
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# /repair/submit and /repair/lookup_phone don't share one bucket).
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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def _check_rate_limit(self, scope="submit"):
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ICP = request.env["ir.config_parameter"].sudo()
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# Scope-specific cap if configured, falls back to the global.
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try:
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limit = int(ICP.get_param(
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f"fusion_repairs.client_portal_rate_limit_per_hour_{scope}",
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ICP.get_param("fusion_repairs.client_portal_rate_limit_per_hour", "10"),
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))
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except (ValueError, TypeError):
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limit = 10
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ip = (
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request.httprequest.headers.get("X-Forwarded-For")
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or request.httprequest.remote_addr
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or "unknown"
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)
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ip = ip.split(",")[0].strip()
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bucket = _now_hour_bucket()
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key = f"{scope}:{ip}:{bucket}"
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# Prune old buckets across all scopes (cheap - dict is small).
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suffix = f":{bucket}"
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for k in list(_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.keys()):
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if not k.endswith(suffix):
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_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.pop(k, None)
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if _RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.get(key, 0) >= limit:
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return True # blocked
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_RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET[key] = _RATE_LIMIT_BUCKET.get(key, 0) + 1
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return False
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# LANDING
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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@http.route("/repair", type="http", auth="public", website=True, sitemap=True)
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def repair_landing(self, **kw):
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return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_landing", {
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"page_name": "client_repair_landing",
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})
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@http.route("/repair/new", type="http", auth="public", website=True,
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sitemap=False)
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def repair_new(self, sn=None, **kw):
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categories = request.env["fusion.repair.product.category"].sudo().search([
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("active", "=", True),
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], order="sequence, name")
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prefilled_serial = (sn or "").strip()
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return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_form", {
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"page_name": "client_repair_new",
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"categories": categories,
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"prefilled_serial": prefilled_serial,
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"error": kw.get("error"),
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})
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SAFE PARTNER LOOKUP (anti-leak)
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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@http.route("/repair/lookup_phone", type="jsonrpc", auth="public",
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website=True)
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def repair_lookup_phone(self, phone=None, **kw):
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if self._check_rate_limit(scope="lookup"):
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return {"error": "rate_limited"}
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cleaned = _e164_clean(phone)
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if len(cleaned) < 7:
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return {"matched": False}
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matches = request.env["res.partner"].sudo().search([
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"|",
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("phone", "ilike", cleaned[-7:]),
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("phone_sanitized", "ilike", cleaned[-7:]),
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], limit=1)
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if matches:
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return _mask_partner_for_lookup(matches[0])
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return {"matched": False}
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# SUBMIT
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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@http.route("/repair/submit", type="http", auth="public", methods=["POST"],
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csrf=True, website=True)
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def repair_submit(self, **post):
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# Honeypot - bots tend to fill every visible field.
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if (post.get("hp_company") or "").strip():
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_logger.info("Client portal submit blocked by honeypot from IP=%s",
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request.httprequest.remote_addr)
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return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=spam")
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if self._check_rate_limit(scope="submit"):
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return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=rate_limited")
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# Required fields.
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partner_name = (post.get("client_name") or "").strip()
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phone = (post.get("client_phone") or "").strip()
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issue_summary = (post.get("issue_summary") or "").strip()
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category_id = int(post.get("category_id") or 0)
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if not (partner_name and phone and issue_summary and category_id):
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return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=missing")
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# Validate email if provided. Empty is allowed; malformed redirects back.
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raw_email = (post.get("client_email") or "").strip()
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clean_email = email_normalize(raw_email) if raw_email else False
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if raw_email and not clean_email:
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return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=email")
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# Find or create partner. Match by phone if known (safe - we already
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# have their consent to contact via this form).
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cleaned_phone = _e164_clean(phone)
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partner = False
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if len(cleaned_phone) >= 7:
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partner = request.env["res.partner"].sudo().search([
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"|",
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("phone", "ilike", cleaned_phone[-7:]),
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("phone_sanitized", "ilike", cleaned_phone[-7:]),
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], limit=1)
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partner_vals = None
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if not partner:
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partner_vals = {
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"name": partner_name,
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"phone": phone,
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"email": clean_email or False,
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"street": (post.get("client_street") or "").strip(),
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"city": (post.get("client_city") or "").strip(),
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}
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# Stage uploaded photos.
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files = request.httprequest.files.getlist("photos")
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attachment_ids = []
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for f in files or []:
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if not getattr(f, "filename", None):
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continue
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data = f.read()
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if not data:
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continue
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attachment_ids.append(request.env["ir.attachment"].sudo().create({
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"name": f.filename,
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"datas": base64.b64encode(data),
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"res_model": "fusion.repair.intake.session",
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"res_id": 0,
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}).id)
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equipment = {
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"repair_category_id": category_id,
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"third_party": post.get("third_party") in ("on", "true", "1"),
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"urgency": post.get("urgency") or "normal",
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"issue_summary": issue_summary,
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"internal_notes": (post.get("internal_notes") or "").strip(),
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"photo_attachment_ids": attachment_ids,
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}
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# Pick a real human owner for the repair so emails go from a person:
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# admin if present, else the lowest-id non-share user, else SUPERUSER_ID.
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admin = request.env.ref("base.user_admin", raise_if_not_found=False)
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if admin:
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intake_uid = admin.id
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else:
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internal = request.env["res.users"].sudo().search(
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[("share", "=", False)], order="id asc", limit=1,
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)
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intake_uid = internal.id if internal else SUPERUSER_ID
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payload = {
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"partner_id": partner.id if partner else None,
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"partner_vals": partner_vals,
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"intake_user_id": intake_uid,
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"equipment_items": [equipment],
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}
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try:
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repairs = request.env["fusion.repair.intake.service"].sudo() \
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.create_repair_orders(payload, source="client_portal")
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except Exception:
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_logger.exception("Client portal repair submit failed")
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return request.redirect("/repair/new?error=server")
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token = hashlib.sha256(
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f"{repairs[0].id}:{repairs[0].create_date}".encode()
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).hexdigest()[:16]
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return request.redirect(f"/repair/thanks?ref={repairs[0].name}&t={token}")
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@http.route("/repair/thanks", type="http", auth="public", website=True,
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sitemap=False)
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def repair_thanks(self, ref=None, t=None, **kw):
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return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_client_repair_thanks", {
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"page_name": "client_repair_thanks",
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"ref": ref or "",
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})
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CL6 / CL7: AI self-check JSONRPC endpoint
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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@http.route("/repair/self_check", type="jsonrpc", auth="public",
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website=True)
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def repair_self_check(self, category_id=None, symptoms=None,
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urgency=None, **kw):
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if self._check_rate_limit(scope="self_check"):
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return {"error": "rate_limited"}
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if not symptoms:
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symptoms = []
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if isinstance(symptoms, str):
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symptoms = [symptoms]
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# Defensive: cap input size to defend against prompt-injection bloat
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symptoms = [str(s)[:500] for s in symptoms[:5]]
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Service = request.env["fusion.repair.ai.service"].sudo()
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return Service.suggest_self_check(
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product_category_id=int(category_id or 0) or None,
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symptoms=symptoms,
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urgency=urgency or None,
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)
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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# CL15: on-call acknowledgement endpoint
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# Only the paged user OR a Repairs Manager can ack - prevents arbitrary
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# internal users (or someone with a forwarded mail) from acknowledging
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# a page they were never paged for.
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# ------------------------------------------------------------------
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@http.route("/repair/on-call/ack/<string:token>", type="http",
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auth="user", website=True, sitemap=False)
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def repair_on_call_ack(self, token, **kw):
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Repair = request.env["repair.order"].sudo()
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repair = Repair.search([("x_fc_on_call_token", "=", token)], limit=1)
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if not repair:
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return request.render(
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"fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_invalid", {},
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)
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user = request.env.user
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is_paged_user = user == repair.x_fc_on_call_paged_user_id
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is_manager = user.has_group("fusion_repairs.group_fusion_repairs_manager")
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if not (is_paged_user or is_manager):
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_logger.warning(
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"On-call ack denied for repair %s - user %s is not the paged "
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"user (%s) and not a Repairs Manager.",
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repair.name, user.login,
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repair.x_fc_on_call_paged_user_id.login or "(none)",
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)
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return request.render(
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"fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_invalid", {},
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)
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Service = request.env["fusion.repair.on.call.service"].sudo()
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Service.acknowledge(repair, user)
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return request.render("fusion_repairs.portal_on_call_ack_ok", {
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"repair_name": repair.name,
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})
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