- P0 IDOR: escape LIKE wildcards in build_scope_domain + normalise emails (email_normalize) on both write and scope sides, so a self-set email of '%' can no longer match every ticket in a deployment (+2 regression tests).
- Convert XML-RPC ProtocolError (central 502/503/429) to _RemoteError instead of a raw 500.
- _resolve_author: log + post as service account on failure instead of silently impersonating the ticket customer.
- _mark_seen now best-effort (runs after the remote post) so a bookkeeping failure can't report a successful reply as failed (no duplicate replies).
- Attachment loop catches network errors + reports failed count (no duplicate-ticket trap); dialog surfaces failures.
- console.error in JS catches for diagnosability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remote message_post escapes a plain str body (expects Markup, which can't cross XML-RPC). Without body_is_html=True the customer's reply rendered literal <p>/<br> tags.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
x_fc_client_label on helpdesk.ticket (+ list/search exposure), create() override sends a branded acknowledgement (magic link via get_portal_url) for in-app-channel tickets only. 3 Enterprise tests (run on nexa).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
submit() now sends partner_email/partner_name/x_fc_client_label. New jsonrpc endpoints my_tickets/ticket_detail/ticket_reply/unread_count, all auth=user with server-side scoping (build_scope_domain), internal-note filtering, and graceful remote-failure handling.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase 1-2: build_ticket_vals/scope/unread helpers (utils.py), fusion.helpdesk.ticket.seen read-tracking model, group_reporter_admin. 10 unit tests pass on local Community.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add _match_api_key() class method to fusion.billing.service, with a
TDD test suite (TestServiceApiKey) covering key generation, hash storage,
positive match, and rejection of bad/inactive keys. Also fix
fcb_test_on_trial.sh to use --http-port 8070, as Odoo 19 forces
http_spawn() even under --no-http when --test-enable is set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Local dev Odoo is Community (can't install the module). Add a guest-exec runner
that syncs the module to the odoo-trial Enterprise sandbox (VM 316, db trial) and
runs --test-enable there; pass = FCB_EXIT=0. Scaffold verified installing on
Odoo 19.0 Enterprise (7 fusion_billing_* tables created).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Centralize billing for all NexaSystems services (NexaCloud, NexaDesk,
NexaMaps, custom apps, memberships) on the Odoo 19 Enterprise instance,
replacing Lago. The module adds only the metering + integration layer;
native sale_subscription / account_accountant / payment_stripe do all the
financial work (invoicing, HST, dunning, portal, credit notes, Stripe).
Includes:
- Design spec (docs/superpowers/specs/2026-05-27-nexa-billing-centralized-design.md):
6 locked decisions, architecture, data model, usage engine, Lago-shaped
API, webhook control loop, NexaCloud pilot, phased dual-run migration.
- Module scaffold: 7 fusion.billing.* models (service, account.link, metric,
charge, usage, webhook, reconciliation), bearer-auth API controller shell,
security ACLs, README. Compiles on Odoo 19.0; engine/API bodies are stubs
pending the implementation plan.
- CLAUDE.md rule #15: no sale.subscription model in Odoo 19 — a subscription
is a sale.order(is_subscription) + sale.subscription.plan (verified live).
Task 0 verified: a single Stripe account is shared across NexaCloud and all
Lago providers, so no Stripe account/card migration is required.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the login string resolves to an existing user and the password is
wrong, BOTH overrides used to write a failure row:
- _check_credentials wrapper: result=failure, reason=bad_password
- _login wrapper (catching the propagating AccessDenied): result=
failure, reason=unknown_user
Discovered in production smoke on westin-v19 after the deploy: a
single failed login for info@gsafinancialconsulting.com produced two
audit rows (one bad_password, one unknown_user). The unknown_user
label was wrong — the user IS in the system.
Fix: _login now checks whether the login string resolves to any user
BEFORE writing the unknown_user row. If yes, _check_credentials
already logged the attempt and _login skips. If no, the user lookup
in super() failed and _login is the only chance to log.
Regression test test_login_known_user_bad_password_single_row asserts
exactly one row per attempt and that the row carries bad_password
(not unknown_user) when the user exists.
30 tests green locally; production smoke on westin-v19 confirms:
one row per failed login, bad_password, IP 172.18.0.1 captured.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Capture in the plan the Odoo 19 gotchas discovered during execution
that the original plan template missed:
- Test command requires --http-port=0 --gevent-port=0 (running
container holds 8069).
- Declarative models.Constraint / models.Index (T2).
- res.users.groups_id renamed to group_ids (T3, T6).
- ir.rule groups is additive not restrictive (T3).
- mail.template inline-template ctx IS env.context (T11).
- ir.cron has no numbercall field in 19 (T12).
- registry.cursor() in tests is TestCursor; cr.commit() raises;
use savepoints (T13).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Asserts the smart-button and Login Activity tab fields are stripped
from res.users get_view() for non-admin users, and present for
Settings admins. Locks down the contract behind the
groups="base.group_system" XML attributes on the form-inheritance
view (the inherited view record cannot carry groups itself per
CLAUDE.md rule #11; the gate must live on the inner nodes).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
5-min cron processes up to 100 pending rows per pass: private IPs
short-circuit to state=private_ip; same-IP cache (30 days) avoids
duplicate ip-api.com calls; reverse DNS via socket with 1.5s timeout;
HTTP lookup respects ip-api''s X-Rl rate-limit header. Tests cover
private-IP shortcut, cache hit (no HTTP), and internal-state skip --
no network calls needed.
Per-row isolation uses cr.savepoint() instead of cr.commit() because
Odoo 19 TestCursor raises AssertionError on commit/rollback. Recorded
the gotcha as CLAUDE.md rule #14.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds _fc_retention_gc() that deletes rows older than the configured
horizon (default 365 days; 0 = keep forever). Registered as a daily
ir.cron. Tests verify both the delete path and the "keep forever"
short-circuit.
Also documents the Odoo 19 gotcha that ir.cron dropped the numbercall
field (the legacy "-1 = run forever" pattern now raises ValueError at
install time; just omit the field).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mail template + helpers (_fc_alert_*, _fc_recent_failure_count,
_fc_send_failure_alert) wired into _check_credentials so that crossing
the consecutive-failure threshold within the window queues exactly one
mail.mail per attempted login per 60-minute cooldown. Master switch
x_fc_login_audit_alert_enabled honoured. Recipients are members of
base.group_system with a non-empty email and share=False; the
__system__ superuser is excluded by Odoo''s default user filter.
Tests (3 new, 22 total green):
test_failure_burst_queues_one_email
test_cooldown_suppresses_second_alert
test_alert_disabled_master_switch
setUp ensures base.user_admin has an email (fusion-dev''s admin user
ships without one; the only user with an email is __system__, which
is filtered out of standard res.users searches).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Four x_fc_* fields on res.config.settings backed by ir.config_parameter:
retention_days (default 365, 0 = forever), alert_threshold (5),
alert_window_min (15), alert_enabled (True). New "Login Audit" block
on the General Settings page (gated by base.group_system on the block,
NOT on the inherited view record per CLAUDE.md rule #11).
CLAUDE.md gotchas added during this task:
#5 Boolean config_parameter fields don't round-trip "False" as a
string — IrConfigParameter.set_param deletes the row on falsy.
Test with assertFalse, never assertEqual(..., "False").
#6 ir.ui.view uses group_ids (Odoo 19 rename mirrored from res.users).
Setting groups_id on an ir.ui.view record raises ValueError at
install. (The XML attribute groups="..." on inner nodes is
unrelated and still works.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
List, form, and search views for fusion.login.audit, plus a "Login
Events" full-history action and a "Failed Logins (24h)" pre-filtered
action. Both surface under Settings -> Technical -> Login Audit
(menu items gated by base.group_system). Views are no-create / no-edit
/ no-delete to enforce append-only at the UI layer too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds four x_fc_* fields on res.users: login_audit_ids (One2many),
login_audit_count (compute), last_successful_login (compute, stored),
last_login_ip (compute, stored). action_fc_view_login_audit returns
a window action scoped to the current user. View inheritance adds a
smart button to the button box and a "Login Activity" page to the
notebook, both gated by base.group_system on the inner XML nodes
(NOT on the view record — Odoo 19 forbids that; see CLAUDE.md rule #11).
Tests (2 new, 18 total green):
test_computed_last_successful_login — uses registry cursor to commit
the audit row so the stored compute picks it up across the
TransactionCase boundary.
test_action_view_login_audit_returns_window_action — smart-button
action shape + domain scoping.
CLAUDE.md rule #11 added: inherited ir.ui.view records cannot have
groups/group_ids on the record; the gate must be on the inner XML nodes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Overrides res.users._login. When the login string does not resolve to
any user, super() raises AccessDenied; we record a row with user_id=NULL
and failure_reason="unknown_user", then re-raise. Closes the gap where
typo'd or scanned logins would otherwise vanish from the audit trail.
The existing _fc_record_login_event helper writes through an independent
registry.cursor(), so the audit row survives the rollback that follows
the re-raised AccessDenied.
Note: in Odoo 19 _login is a plain instance method (not the classmethod
it was in earlier versions) and takes (credential, user_agent_env). The
original plan was written for the classmethod signature; corrected here
and recorded in CLAUDE.md rule #10 so future-Claude does not waste time
re-discovering it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wraps res.users._check_credentials. On AccessDenied, records a row with
result=failure and failure_reason='bad_password' (or '2fa_failed' when
credential['type'] == 'totp'), then re-raises. Regression test asserts
the attempted password value never lands in any audit field.
The audit row is written through registry.cursor() (independent cursor) so
it survives the rollback that follows AccessDenied — in production
odoo/service/model.py::retrying resets the transaction and http.py closes
the cursor without committing, in tests assertRaises opens its own
savepoint. Either way an inline write would vanish. Tests
enter registry_test_mode and use manual try/except to keep the audit row
visible across the savepoint hierarchy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Overrides res.users._update_last_login to create a fusion.login.audit
row with result=success after the parent runs. The write goes through
sudo() + mail_create_nolog=True. Any exception in the audit path is
caught and logged but never propagates — a broken audit table must
never block a real user from logging in.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Single helper builds vals for fusion.login.audit rows from the live
HTTP request, or falls back to ip=''internal'' + geo_lookup_state=''internal''
when there is no request. Parses UA into browser/os/device_type via the
bundled user_agents library. Never reads credential[''password'']. Tests
cover: no-request fallback, UA parsing on a Chrome/Windows UA, and the
regression that no password value leaks into the vals dict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Record rule grants admins an unrestricted domain on the audit log;
ACL forbids write/create/unlink for every group (audit is append-only;
sudo() inside auth hooks is the only write path). Defence-in-depth
layering: ACL is the actual gate, the rule documents and locks down
admin access path.
Tests (5, all green) cover:
test_admin_can_read_through_acl_and_rule — positive path through both.
test_acl_blocks_read_for_regular_user — base.group_user denied by ACL.
test_acl_blocks_read_for_portal_user — base.group_portal share user
denied (sensitive data leakage
surface closed at ACL layer).
test_acl_blocks_write_for_admin — append-only at the write boundary.
test_acl_blocks_unlink_for_admin — append-only at the unlink boundary.
Drop the redundant `from . import tests` from the root __init__.py —
Odoo's test loader imports `odoo.addons.<mod>.tests` directly; the
extra import was dead weight (and inconsistent with the repo pattern).
CLAUDE.md gotchas added during this task:
#6 res.users.groups_id -> group_ids rename (test setUp pitfall).
#6 ir.rule `groups` is additive, not restrictive — group-scoped
rules only apply to users in that group, they do not restrict
non-members. Default to letting the ACL gate; use rules for
row-level filters ACLs cannot express.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- All 16 columns per spec (user, attempted_login, result, failure_reason,
event_time, ip/geo fields, user_agent triple, device_type, database).
- Check constraint binds failure_reason presence to result value.
- Three composite indexes (user+time, login+time, geo_state+time) supporting
the per-user, failure-burst, and geo cron queries.
- Minimal admin-read ACL added so subsequent tests can verify writes.
- 3 TransactionCase tests passing: model create, failure_reason nullable on
success, geo_lookup_state='internal' accepted.
Odoo 19 deprecation note: this implementation uses the declarative
models.Constraint and models.Index attributes (Odoo 19 silently drops the
legacy `_sql_constraints = [...]` list and `init()`/raw-SQL pattern with
only a warning). Captured in CLAUDE.md rule #9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Empty installable module with manifest, package inits, and icon.
Subsequent tasks add the audit model, hooks, views, and tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Durable login audit for Odoo 19 (westin-v19). Captures successful and
failed authentications via _update_last_login / _check_credentials /
_login overrides, surfaces history on res.users as a smart button +
"Login Activity" tab (admins-only), async geo-enriches IPs via ip-api.com
through network_logger, 365-day retention with daily GC cron, and
emails Settings admins on N consecutive failures for the same login
within a configurable window.
Motivation: a spot audit of GSA Accounting (uid 63) showed Odoo's
res_users_log keeps only one row per user (rest is GC'd), /var/log/odoo
is empty (warn-level stdout logging), and the container json log
rotates within days — leaving no durable login trail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
User is on Mac via Tailscale into this Windows host. Browser previews
bound to Windows localhost are unreachable from the Mac browser. Default
to text-based design discussion on this host instead of spinning up the
brainstorming visual companion. Has bitten three times now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Captures all clarifying-question answers + exploration findings so a
fresh Claude Code session on Mac can resume at 'propose architectural
approaches' without re-running the discovery work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs caught by entech battle test on first deploy:
1. Manifest entry landed in the 'demo' list instead of 'data' because
my anchor (fp_demo_shopfloor_data.xml) was already in 'demo' —
the entry pattern-matched into the wrong section. Demo data
doesn't load on entech (no --load demo), so the mail.template
never existed. Moved fp_tablet_pin_reset_template.xml to 'data'.
2. The fp.notification.template wrapper record referenced a model
that doesn't exist until fusion_plating_notifications loads;
fusion_plating_shopfloor doesn't depend on notifications, so
the data load ParseError'd. Removed the wrapper — the controller
calls mail_template.send_mail() directly anyway, not via the
notification dispatcher. Added an inline comment explaining why
the wrapper isn't here.
Battle test updated to drop the (now removed) wrapper xmlid check.
Battle test ALL PASS on entech after fixes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
4 new state-machine modes on FpTabletLock, reusing the existing
FpPinPad 4-cell component:
- request_code : 'Send temp PIN' button screen (no-PIN tile OR
after 3-fail Forgot button)
- enter_temp_code : 4-cell pad for the emailed code
- set_new_pin : 4-cell pad — choose new PIN
- confirm_new_pin : 4-cell pad — confirm new PIN
Trigger paths (per D1 + D2):
- Tap no-PIN tile -> goes straight to request_code mode
(onTileClick dispatches via tile.has_pin)
- Wrong PIN 3 times -> 'Forgot? Reset PIN via email' button appears
below the pad (gated by state.failedAttempts >= 3)
Client-side failedAttempts counter (resets on tile re-select per D14).
Server-side x_fc_tablet_pin_failed_count keeps incrementing to the
existing 5-fail lockout per D13.
After Confirm New PIN succeeds, auto-login fires unlock_session with
the new PIN. If unlock_session fails for any reason, falls back to
'PIN set, tap your tile to log in.' status.
SCSS reuses $lock-* tokens from _tablet_lock_tokens.scss — light +
dark handled by the existing token system (no new tokens needed).
Hand-Off gold gradient repeated for the primary 'Send temporary PIN'
button to match the existing tablet visual language.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mail template renders the 4-digit code in both subject (mobile
notification glance) and body (big bold display). Per Rule 25 only
core res.users fields referenced; the code itself comes from ctx.
fp.notification.template wrapper enables admin UI customization of
the body without touching code. tablet_pin_reset_requested added to
TRIGGER_EVENTS selection.
Daily ir.cron purges used/expired rows > 7 days old (audit trail
lives in fp.tablet.session.event, not here, so aggressive cleanup
is safe).
Manifest bump 19.0.34.2.0 -> 19.0.35.0.0 (triggers asset cache
invalidation on -u so the new template + SCSS load cleanly).
Phase 1 backend complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three controller changes in one commit (tight code coupling):
1. /fp/tablet/request_reset_code (Task 2) — generates 4-digit code,
emails it, returns masked_email. Specific error codes for the
frontend to switch on (no_email + manager_name, rate_limited +
wait_minutes, user_not_found, no_role, inactive). Shop-branch
role check matches existing _check_credentials per Rule 13l + 23
(all_group_ids transitive — Owners reach Technician through
implication).
2. /fp/tablet/verify_reset_code (Task 3) — verifies the emailed
code, on success mints a 5-min HMAC reset_token. Error responses
are specific (no_active_code / expired / too_many_attempts /
wrong_code with attempts_left).
3. set_pin extended to accept reset_token (Task 4) — three auth
paths now: old_pin (existing), reset_token (new), or neither
(existing — only for users with no current hash). reset_token
path is the only one that operates on a user OTHER than env.user;
token proves the legit user just verified their email.
Failure audit reuses existing failed_unlock event_type with a notes
field describing the reset-code-specific reason. Success audit uses
the new pin_reset_requested / pin_reset_code_verified /
pin_set_after_reset event_type values.
_mask_email helper added for the no-email-on-file edge case.
3 more tests cover: valid token roundtrip + set_pin, expired token
rejection, and lockout-cleared-on-reset.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
fp.tablet.pin.reset stores hashed 4-digit codes emailed for self-
service PIN create/reset. Per CLAUDE.md Rule 24 + Rule 13l it follows
the defensive patterns established elsewhere in the shopfloor module:
- PBKDF2-SHA256 hashing (200k iterations, matches ResUsers PIN)
- 72h TTL per D4
- 5 wrong-attempt cap per D5 (invalidates code, used_at set)
- 3 requests/60min rate limit per D6 (raises UserError)
- SQL EXCLUDE constraint enforces one-active-row-per-user per D7
- HMAC-SHA256 reset_token (300s TTL, single-use) for step 3 of
the flow (set_pin via reset_token alternative to old_pin)
Audit event_type extended with 3 new values (pin_reset_requested,
pin_reset_code_verified, pin_set_after_reset). Manager-only ACL on
the new model; sudo when endpoints need access.
10 model-level tests cover generate / replace-active / rate-limit /
verify-correct / verify-wrong / 5-attempt-cap / expired / token sign
roundtrip / tampered-sig / purpose-mismatch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
